

# PLAYBOOK



# LABYRINTH

THE WAR ON TERROR, 2001 – ?

Game Design by Volko Ruhnke

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## A Tutorial of the 2-Player Game

by Joel Toppen

*This tutorial demonstrates the most important aspects of the 2-player game covered in rules sections 1 through 8 of the Rules of Play. We heartily recommend NEW PLAYERS START HERE!*

This tutorial is designed not only to provide examples of play, but also to teach the game to you in an interactive, illustrated manner. It is designed to get you, the gamer, into the game with a minimal amount of fuss. To get the most out of this tutorial, you will want to have the game in front of you so you can move the pieces around as you follow along with this tutorial.

Let's start by (carefully) punching out and sorting the counters. Place the Poor/Islamist Rule and Fair/Good counters in one pile. These are the Governance counters that will be used to track the Governance of Muslim countries. From this stock, place a "Poor" Governance marker in the Adversary space in Libya and Iraq. Place a "Poor" Governance marker in the Ally space in Saudi Arabia. Place a "Fair" marker in the Adversary space of Syria, the Ally space of the Gulf States, and the Neutral space of Pakistan. Place an "Islamist Rule" Governance marker in the Adversary space of Afghanistan.

Next, place the Hard/Soft Posture counters in a separate pile. These are the Posture markers that will be used to track the Posture of Non-Muslim countries.

Next, collect the six WMD Terror Plot markers. Place three of them in the "Pakistani Arsenal" box and three in the "Loose Nuke, HEU, & Kazakh Strain" box on the map. Place the remaining six Terror Plot markers with the numbers 1, 2, and 3 on the back into the "Available Plots" box on the map.

Now place the Aid/Besieged Regime markers in a pile off to the side. Place one of these markers on the Besieged Regime side in Somalia. Likewise, place the Cadre markers and Regime Change markers in separate piles off to the side.

Now, let's put some essential game markers on the map:

- Place the US (star) and Jihadist (crescent) "Reserve" markers in the "0" space on the appropriate Reserves track on the map.
- Place the blue "Good Resources" marker on the "0" space and the green "Islamist Resources" marker on the "1" space on the map's Victory track.
- Place the "Fair/Good Countries" marker on the "3" space and the "Poor/Islamist Countries" marker on the "4" space on the map's Victory track.
- Place the "Troops" marker in the "Low Intensity" box on the Troops track on the map.
- Place the "Jihadist Funding" marker in the "9" space on the Funding track on the map.
- Place the "Card" marker in the Jihadist Action Phase "Card 1" box and the "Deck" marker in the "1 Deck" box on the map's Play Sequence track.
- Place the "US Prestige" marker in the "7" box on the map's US Prestige track.
- Place the US Posture marker on its "US Hard" side in the "Hard" box on the map's US GWOT Relations track.
- Place the World Posture marker on its "World Hard" side in the "1" box on the map's US GWOT Relations track.

All of the remaining counters are Event markers which serve as a

mnemonic when Events are played. Place these markers in a pile off to the side for use later.

Now let's put those cool wooden bits on the map! The black cylinders are Jihadist Cells. The tan cubes are US Troops. Place five Troop cubes in the "Overstretch" and "War" boxes on the map's Troops track. Place one Troop cube in the "Low Intensity" box on the Troops Track. Place two Troop cubes in Saudi Arabia and the remaining two Troop cubes in the Gulf States. Similarly, place five Cell cylinders in the "Ample" and "Moderate" boxes on the map's Jihadist Funding track. Place one Cell in the "Tight" box on the Jihadist Funding Track. Place the remaining four Cells in Afghanistan, crescent side down. Please note that only fifteen cubes and fifteen cylinders are used in the game and these will remain on the mapboard at all times. Surplus cubes/cylinders should be used to replace lost or damaged bits.

Lastly, let's get the cards ready for play. You might note that in this game, unlike some card-driven games, both players will draw their cards from a single deck.

For the purposes of this tutorial, collect the following cards which will be used to fill the Jihadists' opening hand: *Mossad & Shin Bet* (#22), *Sharia* (#28), *Hijab* (#35), *Abu Sayyaf* (#57), *Opium* (#72), *Axis of Evil* (#78), *Leak* (#85), *Wahhabism* (#95), and *Hizb Ut-Tahrir* (#100).

Similarly, collect the following cards to fill the US' opening hand: *Moro Talks* (#4), *Ethiopia Strikes* (#15), *Libyan WMD* (#39), *Pakistani Offensive* (#42), *Gaza War* (#63), *HEU* (#65), *Saddam* (#92), *Iran* (#104), and *Jaysh al-Mahdi* (#106).

Voila! The game is now set up for the "Let's Roll!" scenario listed on the back of the Rules of Play.

Now that the game is set up, let's look over the map.

Please stop here and read sections 4.1–4.4 in the rulebook.

All done? Excellent! As you found in the rulebook, there are basically three types of countries in the game: Muslim, Non-Muslim, and then you have Iran which is a special country in the game. Muslim countries are easily distinguished by the presence of an Alignment track while Non-Muslim countries have only a Posture box.

You may have noticed in the setup that the "Islamist Resources" marker was placed in the "1" box on the Victory track. This is due to Afghanistan (which has a Resource value of 1) being under Islamist Rule. Counting up the number of countries with Poor Governance and Islamist Rule, we find that there are four such countries—thus, the placement of the "Poor/Islamist Countries" marker on the Victory track. Similarly, there are three Fair Governance countries and no Good Governance Muslim countries, and so the "Good/Fair Countries" marker is placed on the "3" box on the Victory track. Do note that Non-Muslim countries have a fixed Governance rating and are not considered on the Victory Track in any way.

Speaking of Non-Muslim countries, you will note that only one country has a "Posture" at the present time: Israel which is always "Hard" (see 4.3.3). Presently there is 1 Hard country and 0 Soft countries marked on the map. The difference between the two postures is 1 Hard, thus the World GWOT marker is presently on the "1 Hard" box on the US GWOT Relations track.

Now let's look at the Troop and Funding tracks. But first, stop here and read section 4.7.

Now you know how the game’s various tracks and boxes work. Perhaps the most critically important concept in the game is how the Troop cubes and Cell cylinders are placed and removed from their track: They are removed from left to right and replaced from right to left, with no box containing more than five Troops or Cells. It is also important to note that the placement of the “Troops” and “Jihadist Funding” markers determine how many cards the player will draw. Right now both players will draw a hand of 9 cards since the Troop level is still in the “Low Intensity” box—the left-most box with less than five Troop cubes; and the Funding is “maxed out” at “9” on the Funding track.

Lastly, before we get rolling, please stop here and read section 5 from the rulebook. Don’t worry; it’s not a long section.


Now you know how the sequence of play works. Unlike most card-driven wargames, in this game each player will play two cards during his impulse. This allows players to set up both fun and interesting combinations of card play. Now let’s start playing!

### Jihadist Card 1:

Each of the game’s cards has two key pieces of information: an Event which is either US-associated, Jihadist-associated, or Unas-associated; and an Operations (OPS) value from 1 to 3. Whenever a card is played the player must declare whether he is using it for its Event or for its OPS value (note that the *US Election* card’s event is unique in that when it is played, both the OPS value and the Event are used). If a card is played for its OPS value and that card’s Event is associated with the other player, the event will be triggered. This means that both players must plan carefully how they play their cards so as to minimize the damage that enemy-associated events can inflict. Please stop here and read section 4.10 and section 6 from the rulebook.

The first order of business for the Jihadist is to recruit more Cells. Section 8.0 of the rulebook contains all of the rules governing Jihadist Operations. Please stop here and read sections 8.1 and 8.2.

All right! Now you are an expert on how Recruiting Operations work! Right now Afghanistan’s Governance is “Islamist Rule.” This means that the Jihadist player won’t have to dice against the country’s Governance in order to recruit Cells from the Funding Track; the recruitment attempt is automatically successful. The Jihadist player plays *Hijab* (#35) which is a US Event and declares his intent to use its OPS value to Recruit in Afghanistan. The Event



The Jihadist player uses all three Ops to place three cells in Afghanistan. The cells start as Sleeper cells.

is a US-associated Event, but the Event’s precondition renders it unplayable so the Event does not trigger. All three OPS are used to Recruit in Afghanistan. Three Cells are moved from the Funding track to Afghanistan where they are placed on their Sleeper side (crescent-side down; blank side upright).

*Hijab* is then discarded. Note that if the Event had been triggered, the card would have been removed permanently from the game. The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the Jihadist “Card 2” box.



### Jihadist Card 2:

For their second play, the Jihadists decide to Travel with some Cells out of Afghanistan. Please stop here and read section 8.3. Now you should have an idea of how the Travel Operation works.

Whenever a card is used for Operations, you must spend all OPS to conduct the same Operation. In other words, you can’t use 1 OP for Travel and then 2 OPS for Recruiting with the same card (see 8.1). Furthermore, you must declare up front what you intend to do with the OPS and where you intend to conduct that Operation before you resolve any portion of the Operation.

The Jihadists decide to play *Wahhabism* for its 3 OPS. The declared Operation is Travel. Three Cells will Travel from Afghanistan. One Cell will travel to Pakistan, one Cell will travel to Russia, and one Cell will travel to the Philippines. Since Pakistan is adjacent to Afghanistan, the Cell which travels to Pakistan arrives safely. If it were an “Active” Cell (crescent side up), it would shift to “Sleeper” but since it was already a “Sleeper” it remains “Sleeper.”



A 3-Ops card is used to move three cells from Afghanistan.



Now let's resolve the Cells traveling to Russia and the Philippines. But first, stop here and read section 4.9 in the rulebook, paying very close attention to rule 4.9.4.

Two of the three destination countries are untested: Russia and the Philippines. We'll start with the Philippines. Look at the Jihadist Player Aid Card and reference the Initial Test table. Since the Philippines is a Non-Muslim country, we will test the Philippines' Posture. Look now at the Posture table. The only die roll modifier (DRM) to this table is a +1 which applies when testing the US' Posture. No DRM will apply to this test die roll. A die is cast and the result is a '2' which results in the Philippines adopting a "Soft" Posture. The World GWOT is immediately adjusted. Since there is now 1 Hard and 1 Soft Non-Muslim country, the World GWOT marker shifts to the "0" box on the US World GWOT track.



Since the Philippines is not adjacent to Afghanistan, the Cell traveling from Afghanistan must dice against the target country's Governance, rolling less than or equal to the Governance rating to determine whether the Cell arrives safely or not. The Philippines has Fair Governance and so the Cell traveling there must roll a 1-2 in order to successfully arrive. The die roll is a '1' and so the Cell arrives safely.

Finally, we resolve the Cell traveling to Russia. Since Russia is untested we must test it as we did the Philippines. The test die roll is a '5' so Russia is marked with "Hard" Posture. The World GWOT marker shifts back to the "1 Hard" space on the US World GWOT track.

Like the Philippines, Russia is not adjacent to Afghanistan so the Cell traveling there has to dice for survival. The Governance of Russia is also Fair so a 1-2 is required. The die roll, however, is a '6.' The Cell is eliminated and sent back to the Funding Track. Place it into the right-most box with less than five Cells (leaving nine Cells on the Funding track).



The "Card" marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US "Card 1" box.

### US Card 1:

Wanting to shore up things in the Gulf before dealing with Afghanistan, the US opens things up by playing *HEU* for its OPS. Since neither Russia nor Central Asia currently have a Cell, the event's precondition is not met so the event does not trigger. The US player declares his intention to use the OPS to conduct a War of Ideas operation in the Gulf States. Please stop here and read section 7.1 and section 7.2 from the rulebook.




The US player conducts a War of Ideas Operation against the Gulf States. A "5" is needed for success, but a "4" is rolled. The operation fails but an Aid marker is placed.

As you noticed from the rules, OPS are used very differently by the US than by the Jihadists. In order to conduct an Operation in a country, the US player must play a card with an OPS value greater than or equal to the Governance rating of that country. Since the Gulf States has Fair Governance, a card with at least 2 OPS must be used to conduct an Operation there.

Now, let's conduct that War of Ideas Operation. Grab the US Player Aid Card and look at the War of Ideas Operation summary. Since the target is a Muslim country we will use the Muslim country segment of the summary. Next, we are going to roll one die, consult the War of Ideas Table, and add any applicable DRMs. The target die roll for success is a '5' or higher. Presently two DRMs apply: the +1 for High US Prestige (see the US Prestige track on the map), and the -1 for attempting to improve Governance to Good (the country is presently a Fair Ally). The die roll is a '4.' The DRMs cancel each other out and so the final result is '4;' one pip short of success.

The War of Ideas Operation is a failure but all is not lost. Since the attempt failed by one pip an "Aid" marker is placed in the Gulf States. So long as the Aid marker remains in the Gulf States, future War of Ideas operations there will have a +1 DRM for Aid.


The "Card" marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US "Card 2" box.



An Aid marker provides a +1 DRM for all future War of Ideas success rolls.

**US Card 2:**

The first attempt at War of Ideas in the Gulf States failed, but the US did get an Aid marker, so the US player decides to give War of Ideas a second go. He plays *Ethiopia Strikes* for its OPS value and declares he will wage War of Ideas in the Gulf States. The only difference now is that there will be a net DRM of +1 (+1 for High Prestige, -1 for shifting to Good, and +1 for Aid). The die is cast and the result is a ‘6;’ more than enough for success. Look again at the War of Ideas summary on the US Player Aid Card. Please note that the US can only improve the Governance of an “Ally.” If a country is marked with a “Neutral” alignment, a War of Ideas success will shift the Alignment to “Ally.” War of Ideas cannot be used in a country with an “Adversary” Alignment. Since Success resulted in the Governance shifting to Good, all Regime Change, Besieged Regime, and Aid markers are removed. In our case here, the Aid marker is removed. Finally, the “Good Resources” marker on the Victory track is shifted to the “3” box since the Gulf States has a Resource value of ‘3.’



**Resolve Plots:**

The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US “Resolve Plots” box. At this point any unresolved Plots on the map are resolved. Presently there are no Plots so we can move the “Card” marker back to the Jihadist “Card 1” box on the Play Sequence track.

**Jihadist Card 1:**

For their next play, the Jihadists decide to put some pressure on the US in Southeast Asia by playing *Abu Sayyaf* for its nasty event. Per the event’s text a Cell is placed in the Philippines from the Funding track (leaving 8 Cells on the Funding track). Since the Philippines has already been tested, we don’t need to do that again. But since *Abu Sayyaf* is an Event with lingering effects we need to place an Event Marker (note that such Events have the word “Mark” on the card to remind players to place an Event marker). Event markers can be placed in the Events in Play box on the map. Some Events, however, have a geographic application and so have a special holding box near the country or countries they impact. Place the *Abu Sayyaf*



The *Abu Sayyaf* event places one cell in the Philippines and the *Abu Sayyaf* Event marker in the holding box.

*Sayyaf* marker in the appropriate holding box above the Philippines country space on the map.

Finally, *Abu Sayyaf*, if played as an Event, is removed from the game permanently—it can only be played as an Event once. Place it off to the side; do not discard it.

The “Card” marker is advanced to the Jihadist “Card 2” box on the Play Sequence track.

**Jihadist Card 2:**

The Jihadist now want to hurt US Prestige by Plotting in the Philippines. Please pause here and read section 8.5 from the rulebook.

All set? Excellent, now you’ll be able to hatch some Plots in no time! As per the *Abu Sayyaf* event, the US loses one Prestige (-1) for each Plot placed—not resolved!—in the Philippines unless the number of Troops outnumber the Cells in the Philippines (note also that *Abu Sayyaf* does allow the US to Deploy to the Philippines even though it is not a Muslim country; more on Deployment later). The Jihadists happen to be holding a dangerous US-associated Event: *Sharia*. Not wanting this event to trigger, the Jihadist player plays *Sharia* and declares his intention to use it to Plot. Since this is the Jihadists’ first Plot attempt of the turn, the event does not trigger (see 8.5.3). This is one method the Jihadist player can use to “bury” a US-associated event.

The Jihadists announce they will use both OPS to Plot in the Philippines. You might note that only two OPS could be used to Plot in the Philippines since the Jihadists only have two Cells in the country. Dicing against the Philippines’ Fair Governance, the Jihadist player will need a 1-2 in order to place a Plot marker. Two dice (one for each OP) are rolled and the result is a pair of ‘1s’—snake-eyes! Two Terror Plot markers are placed face-down by the Jihadists. The Jihadist player looks at the Plot markers, secretly selects two “2” Plot markers, and places them face-down in the Philippines. Note that since a 2-OPS card was played, only “1” Plot and “2” Plot markers could be selected.



Next, as per the *Abu Sayyaf* event, the US loses two Prestige points (-2); one for each Plot marker placed. The “Prestige” marker moves from “7” to “5” on the US Prestige track. The *Sharia* card is then placed in the “1st Plot” holding box on the lower-left of the map as a reminder that the Jihadist player has used his “1st Plot” ability to “bury” a US event.

The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US “Card 1” box.





### US Card 1:

Smarting from this blow, the US player opts to use *Moro Talks* to counter *Abu Sayyaf*. As per the event, the Jihadist player loses one Funding and the *Abu Sayyaf* event is “Blocked” (see 6.2.8). The “Jihadist Funding” marker is moved from the “9” box to the “8” box on the Funding track. To Mark the play of this event, flip the *Abu Sayyaf* event marker over to its *Moro Talks* side. The *Moro Talks* card is then removed from the game permanently.

The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US “Card 2” box.

### US Card 2:

The US player now has a difficult decision: He can use a card to Alert one of the Plots in the Philippines but he can only get rid of one of the Plots by doing so. No matter what, one of these Plots is going to go off during the upcoming Resolve Plots phase and thus, no matter what, Jihadist funding will go back up to “9” on the Funding track. Tough decision, but that’s what this game is all about. Pragmatically, the US player chooses to ignore the Plots in the Philippines and instead decides to conduct a Regime Change in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom is a go! Please stop here and read section 7.3 which governs the Deploy Operation—“Regime Change” is a special form of Deployment.

All set? Okay, let’s roll!

Note that Regime Change in Afghanistan is only possible since, (a) Afghanistan is under Islamist Rule Governance; (b) the US has a Posture of Hard; and (c) Sufficient Troops are available. The US Player must play a 3-OPS card to conduct this Operation. He plays *Libyan WMDs* for the 3 OPS and announces his intention to conduct a Regime Change in Afghanistan. Six Troop Cubes are Deployed from the Troops track to Afghanistan. The “Troops” marker is then shifted into the right-most box with fewer than five Troops, in this case, the “War” box on the Troops track. Note that in a Deployment all Troops deploying must come from the same location (a country or the troops track which effectively represents the United States). Note also that more Troops could have been deployed, but if any more Troops were deployed the “Troops” marker would have shifted to the “Overstretch” box. Remember that the position of the “Troops” marker governs how many cards are drawn at the end of a turn. Going into Overstretch is a risky move so the US player sensibly sends the minimum Troop requirement for the Regime Change: six Troops.

Next, all four Cells in Afghanistan go Active. Flip all four cylinders over so their “Active” (i.e. crescent) side is facing up. Place a “Regime Change” marker into Afghanistan on its green side. If players discerned that the game was not near the end, they could skip an end of turn step and place the Regime Change marker on its tan side, since it will be flipped soon anyway (see 4.8.2 Note). But for the sake of thoroughness, we’ll use the green side.



Next, Afghanistan’s Alignment changes to Ally and the US player must roll to determine its Governance. Using the Governance table on the US Player Aid Card, a single die is rolled. The US Player gets lucky and rolls a ‘5.’ Afghanistan becomes an Ally with Fair Governance. The “Fair/Good Countries” marker is moved to the “4”

box on the Victory track (there are now four such countries on the map) while the “Poor/Islamist Countries” marker is moved back to the “3” box—the markers effectively switch places. Note that the “Islamist Resources” marker is not moved to the “0” box yet (there are no longer any countries on the map under Islamist Rule). This will only take place as a part of the End of Turn sequence when the Regime Change marker is flipped.

You’re probably thinking, “Wow! Regime Change is pretty powerful!” Yeah, but it’s a double-edged sword:

- Jihadists’ Recruit Operations in a Regime Change country are automatically successful.
- The US cannot Deploy out of a Regime Change country unless he has a surplus of five Troops over the number of Cells in the country—thus, Troops are tied down, which in turn impacts hand size.
- The US cannot wage War of Ideas in the Regime Change country unless it has a surplus of five Troops over the number of Cells in the country—and since a country is marked with “Regime Change” until its Governance shifts to Good, completing a Regime Change may be a time-consuming endeavor.
- The US must also take a Prestige check after conducting a Regime Change which has a high probability of causing the US Prestige to go down. In fact, that’s what we’re going to do next.

Look now at the Prestige table on the US Player Aid Card. A single die is cast. The result is a “6.” Lucky! US Prestige will go up rather than down. Just how much the Prestige shift will be is determined by a subsequent die roll of two dice. The lower of the two dice determines the amount to shift. The US player rolls a ‘4’ and a ‘1.’ US Prestige will go up by the lower of these two die rolls: it will go up by 1. The “US Prestige” marker is moved from the “5” to the “6” box on the Prestige track.



### Resolve Plots:

The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US “Resolve Plots” box. We have two Plots to resolve in the Philippines. Each Plot is revealed in turn by the Jihadist player. Both Plots are “2” Plots. The First one is revealed and resolved. Look now at the Unblocked Plots table on the Jihadist Player Aid Card. Since the Plot is in a Non-Muslim country other than the United States, we will use that portion of the table only. First, the Plot’s numeric value is added to the Jihadist Funding—in this case, the Jihadists’ funding would go up by two (+2). Since the “Jihadist Funding” marker cannot be set higher than “9” on the Funding track, the excess funding benefit is ignored. Move the “Jihadist Funding” marker to the “9” box on the Funding track. Next, the Posture must be rolled in the Philippines. A single die is cast and the Posture table consulted. The die roll is a ‘2’ and the Philippines remains Soft. The Plot marker is placed back into the Available Plots box on the map.

Now the second Plot is resolved in the same manner. There is no adjustment to the Jihadist Funding since Funding is presently topped off at “9.” Another Posture roll is made for the second Plot. This time a ‘6’ is rolled. The Philippines Posture changes to Hard! Now

there are three Hard countries and no Soft countries so the World GWOT marker is moved to the “3 Hard” space on the US World GWOT Relations track. The Plot backfired on the Jihadists.

The “Card” marker is moved back to the Jihadist “Card 1” box on the Play Sequence track.

### Jihadist Card 1:

Now the Jihadists are in the hot seat. They have four Active Cells in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is under Fair Governance which makes the Active Cells there quite vulnerable. Deciding that the Cells there will likely die any way, the Jihadist player decides to wage a Jihad. Jihad comes in two varieties: Major Jihad and Minor Jihad. Please stop here and read section 8.4 of the rulebook.

Now you know how Jihad functions. In many ways Jihad is the counterpart to the US War of Ideas Operation. It’s the Jihadist player’s primary tool for degrading a country’s Governance.

The Jihadist player plays *Axis of Evil* and declares his intention of using two of the card’s OPS for a Minor Jihad in Afghanistan and one OP for Jihad in Pakistan. For the Jihad in Afghanistan two dice are rolled against Afghanistan’s Governance: a ‘6’ and a ‘2.’ The ‘6’ is a failure. The Cell conducting this Operation is eliminated and sent back to the Funding track (there are now 9 Cells on the Funding track). The ‘2’ is a success! The Cell conducting this Operation is set to Active—all Cells in Afghanistan are already Active so there is no further effect here. Looking at the Jihad table on the Jihadist Player Aid Card you will find that a success will degrade the Governance of the country one level, but not to Islamist Rule—that requires a Major Jihad Operation. Afghanistan’s Governance is degraded to Poor. Note that Minor Jihad success does not alter Alignment, only Governance. The “Fair/Poor Countries” and “Poor/Islamist Countries” markers swap places again on the Victory track.

Next, the Cell in Pakistan conducts its Minor Jihad roll and rolls a ‘1.’ Pakistan’s Governance is shifted down to Poor and the Sleeper Cell that conducted the Operation goes Active. The “Poor/Islamist Countries” marker moves from the “4” to the “5” box and the “Fair/Good Countries” marker moves down from the “3” to the “2” box on the Victory track.

The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the Jihadist “Card 2” box.

### Jihadist Card 2:

For his next act, the Jihadist player plays *Opium* for its event. As per the Event text, three Cells are placed on their Sleeper side in Afghanistan from the Funding Track (leaving six Cells on the Funding track).

The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US “Card 1” box.

### US Card 1:

The US cannot even begin to wage War of Ideas in Afghanistan until he eliminates some of the Cells there. Remember, in a Regime Change, the US must have a surplus of five Troops over the number of Cells in that country. And so a Disrupt Operation seems to be in order for the US. Please stop here and read section 7.4 from the rulebook.

All ready to disrupt some *Al Qaeda* fighters? In order to conduct any operations card play in Afghanistan right now, a 3-OPS card must be played (since the Governance is Poor; the US must play an

OPS card with a value greater than or equal to the Governance of the target country). The US chooses to play *Saddam* for its 3 OPS. The Jihadist event is playable and the event triggers. The US can choose whether the event triggers before or after the US resolves his operations. In this case he triggers the event first. The event’s effect, however, is meaningless since the Jihadist Funding is all topped off at “9” already.

Now look at the Disrupt table on the US Player Aid Card. Since the Disrupt Operation is conducted in a country with 2+ Troops two things will happen: first, two Cells will be affected; and secondly, US Prestige will be increased by +1. For each Cell affected, the US player can either cause a Sleeper to go Active, or send an Active Cell back to the Funding Track. The US player chooses the latter course, killing two Cells and sending them back to the Funding Track (there are now 8 Cells on the track). The US Prestige marker is moved from the “6” to the “7” box, putting the US in the “High” Prestige bracket once more. Please note that the +1 Prestige benefit for Disrupting in a country with Troops is for conducting the Disrupt Operation; so long as at least one Cell or Cadre is affected, the +1 Prestige Benefit applies.



The “Card” marker is advanced on the Play Sequence track to the US “Card 2” box.

### US Card 2:

Not wanting the Jihadists to set up an Islamist state in Pakistan—which would provide the Jihadist player with the Pakistani WMD Arsenal (see 8.4.5)—the US player plays *Iran* for its event. Since Pakistan is a Shia-Mix Muslim country (green circle with white star and crescent) the event may be used there. The Cell in Pakistan is eliminated and sent to the Funding Track (now 9 Cells on the track). Since the last Cell was removed by an event, a “Cadre” marker is placed in the country—Cadre markers are also placed when the last Cell is removed by a Disrupt Operation (see 4.8.4).


There are no Plots to Resolve so the “Card” marker is moved back on the Play Sequence track to the Jihadist “Card 1” box.

### Jihadist Card 1:

Not wanting to be hemmed in, the Jihadist player decides to take a chance and try to get a Cell into Somalia. He plays *Hizb Ut-Tahrir* for its 1 OP and announces his intention to move the lone Active Cell from Afghanistan to Somalia.

Since Somalia is presently unmarked, it needs first of all to be tested. A single die is cast and the Governance table on the Jihadist Player Aid Card is consulted. The die roll is a ‘3’ and so Somalia is marked with a Poor Governance marker and its alignment set to Neutral. The “Poor/Islamist Countries” marker is moved from the “5” to the “6” box on the Victory track.


Next, since Somalia is not adjacent to Afghanistan, the country from which the Cell is traveling, a die must be rolled against the destination country's Governance. The die roll is a '2' and the Cell arrives safely and is placed on its Sleeper side. Note that if the Jihadist player wished, he could have used the single OP to Travel in place and simply flip the Active Cell in Afghanistan to its Sleeper side.



The "Card" marker is advanced to the Jihadist "Card 2" box on the Play Sequence track.

### Jihadist Card 2:

Somalia is a great target for a Major Jihad since it is already marked with a Besieged Regime marker. With that thought in mind, the Jihadist player uses his next card to Recruit in Somalia. *Mossad & Shin Bet* is played for its 2 OPS. The event's precondition is not met (there are no Cells in Israel, Jordan, or Lebanon) so the event does not trigger. Both Recruit attempts will be made in Somalia: a '2' and a '3' are rolled—again the Jihadist rolls well! Two Cells are recruited in Somalia. With three Cells in Somalia, the US has a whole new set of worries!



The "Card" marker is advanced to the US "Card 1" box on the Play Sequence track.

### US Card 1:

The US decides to stay the course and focus on Afghanistan, playing *Jaysh al-Mahdi* for its event. The Shia minority in Afghanistan throw in their lot with the US! Afghanistan is a Shia-mix country with Cells and Troops present so the event is playable there. Two Cells are removed to the Funding track (now 9 Cells on the track). Note that Sleeper or Active status had no bearing whatsoever on this event!

The "Card" marker is advanced to the US "Card 2" box on the Play Sequence track.

### US Card 2:


Wanting to keep up the pressure in Afghanistan, the US now plays Pakistani Offensive for its 3-OP value. The US declares a War of Ideas operation in Afghanistan. This is now possible since there are six Troop cubes and only one Cell in the country—a surplus of five Troops over Cells in the Regime Change country.

The only DRM that will apply is the +1 for High US Prestige—the US Prestige marker is on the "7" box of the US Prestige track. The die roll is a '4' which is just enough with the +1 DRM to produce the target final die roll of '5.' The Governance of Afghanistan shifts to Fair. The "Fair/Good Countries" marker moves up from the "2" to the "3" box and the "Poor/Islamist Countries" marker moves down to the "5" box on the Victory track.

There are no Plots to be resolved so the "Card" marker is moved back to the Jihadist "Card 1" box on the Play Sequence track.

### Jihadist Card 1:

With their last card of the turn, *Leak*, the Jihadists will choose a "Recruit" operation. Note that the Jihadists cannot hold or save any cards from one turn to the next. Note also that the US will tend to be able to enjoy the last card play of each turn. It is with this in mind that the Jihadist player declares his intent to Recruit one Cell in Afghanistan and two in Somalia. The Recruit operation in Afghanistan is automatically successful since the country is still marked as "Regime Change." One Cell is moved from the Funding track to Afghanistan and is placed on its Sleeper side.



For Somalia, however, the Jihadist player must dice against the target country's Governance rating to determine whether the Recruit operation is successful. Since two Recruit attempts were declared for Somalia, two dice are cast. The die rolls are a pair of '3s.' Two Cells are moved from the Funding track to Somalia where they are placed on their Sleeper side. Six Cells remain on the Funding track.

Since the Jihadist player is out of cards, the "Card" marker is moved forward to the US "Card 1" box on the Play Sequence track.

### US Card 1:

The final US card is *Gaza War*. As you see in rule 6.3.2.3, discard of a card does not normally trigger the event. You may recall that in section 5 of the rulebook, 5.2.4 to be precise, the US has some options when left with one card in his hand:

- He can hold it in his hand. Holding the card does not prohibit the US player from playing that card later in that same turn. Or...
- He can play it. Or...
- He can discard it.

If the Jihadist player still had a card to play, the US player would be advised to hold his card in case the Jihadist player used one of his cards to do something requiring a US response. But in this case, since the Jihadist player has played all of his cards, the US player must choose whether to play or discard the event card or hold it for the next turn. The event is a Jihadist-associated event and its effect is unpleasant: it adds +1 to the Jihadist Funding track and causes discard of a US card (not issues at the present) and it subtracts -1 Prestige from the US Prestige track (a considerable issue since the US would find itself without that lovely +1 DRM for War of Ideas if the US Prestige marker were moved back to box "6" on the US Prestige track). The US player chooses the sensible course and discards the event. This, incidentally, is the main way in which the US can "bury" a Jihadist event to keep it from triggering.

Since both players are out of cards and there are no Plots to resolve, the turn comes to an end. Now look at the "End of Turn" sequence below the Play Sequence track on the map. Starting with the top, we will conduct each applicable step:

1. The Jihadist Funding marker is moved back one box; the marker moves to box "8" on the Funding track, but since it is still in the "Ample" bracket, the Jihadist player will enjoy a 9-card hand next turn.
2. Next, the US loses one Prestige if there is any country under Islamist Rule. There are no Islamist Rule countries at present so this step has no effect. But do note that the effect could be considerable.



It's easy for new players to ignore the low-resource value countries like Somalia but consider the end-of-turn effect of having Somalia under Islamist rule: -1 Prestige every turn! That can be debilitating if the US doesn't do something about it.

3. Next, the US gains one Prestige if the World GWOT Posture is the same as the US and in the "3" box on the US GWOT Relations track on the map. Since that is the case right now the US gains 1 Prestige, moving the US Prestige marker to the "8" box on the US Prestige track. The US is one box closer to a very powerful "High Prestige" War of Ideas DRM.

4. Now we place any cards in the Lapsing Events and 1st Plot boxes from the map onto the Discard Pile. Some Events like *GTMO* and *Oil Price Spike* have only a one-turn impact. We didn't see any of those this turn, but we did see one card played into the "1st Plot" box. *Sharia* is moved from the "1st Plot" box to the discard pile.

5. Next, we reset the Reserves markers to zero. We didn't use these this turn so this step has no effect. Reserves can be used to augment the OPS value of a card. A player can, for example, play a 1 OPS card and place that OP in Reserves—effectively saving the OP point for later. Then in a future card play, that player can play another OPS card and add the saved Reserves value to that card play (to a maximum of 3 OPS) in order to conduct an Operation. See 6.3.3 for all the rules on Reserves.

6. Now we draw new hands. The US "Troops" marker is in the War box on the Troops track so the US will draw 8 cards. The "Jihadists Funding" marker is in the Ample bracket on the Funding track so the Jihadists will draw 9 cards. Note that the position of the "Troops" marker determines the number of cards to be drawn; it does not determine "hand-size." If, for example, the US held its last card, it would still draw 8 cards at this time. Thus, if the US held a card and the "Troops" marker was on the "Low Intensity" box on the Troops track, they would start the following turn with 10 cards in hand.

7. Finally, the green Regime Change marker in Afghanistan is flipped to its tan side. The "Jihadist Resources" marker is now moved from "1" to "0" on the Victory track since there are no longer any countries under Islamist Rule and all Regime Change markers are on their tan side.

That concludes one entire turn's worth of play. The "Card" marker is back to the Jihadist "Card 1" box on the Play Sequence track, ready for the next turn.

Note that there isn't a "turn track" per se in Labyrinth. Play continues until there are not enough cards in the draw pile to fill a card draw. When this happens, the "Deck" marker is moved one box towards the "End" box on the Play Sequence track and the deck is reshuffled. If this had been the case in step 6 above, the game immediately would have ended and the victory conditions in 2.3 consulted—before flipping the Regime Change marker placed that turn from green to tan.

We've completed an entire turn in this tutorial, but since there is one major Operation which we have not yet been able to demonstrate, we will continue play for one more card play.

### Jihadist Card 1:

Let's assume the Jihadists drew at least one 3-OPS card at the end of the previous turn: *GTMO* (#114). For their first card play of the following turn the Jihadists play *GTMO* for its 3-OPS value and declare their intent to wage a Major Jihad in Somalia. Look at the

Jihadist Player Aid Card and note the Jihad Operation summary. When conducting a Major Jihad it is important to remember that this operation has an important prerequisite: the Jihadist player must have a surplus of five Cells over the number of Troops in that country in order to conduct that operation. Since there are five Cells and 0 Troops presently in Somalia, that prerequisite condition is met.

Next, all Cells in the country go "Active." Finally, as with a Minor Jihad, a number of dice are rolled according to the OPS value of the card played to launch the operation. In this case a 3 OPS card was played so the Jihadist player gets to roll three dice. The dice will be rolled against the governance of the target country. Somalia has Poor Governance so a 1-3 will be a success; 4-6 will be a failure. Three dice are cast and the results are 4, 6, and 2. Ordinarily, in order for a Major Jihad to shift Poor to Islamist Rule (and remember that Major Jihad is the only way to shift Governance to Islamist Rule), two successes must be thrown in the single Operation (see 8.4.2). For each failed die roll, as with a Minor Jihad, a Cell is sent back to the Funding Track. If three dice are thrown in a Poor Governance country and the operation fails to shift the Governance to Islamist Rule, this constitutes a Major Jihad Failure which shifts the Alignment of the target country one box towards "Ally." Major Jihad Failure is not a total loss, however, as the Jihadists get to place a "Besieged Regime" marker in the country—if there isn't one there already.

Now in this case, three dice were thrown but two were failures; the '4' and the '6' each cause a Cell to be moved back to the Funding track. Only the '2' die roll was a success. Ordinarily this would have been a Major Jihad Failure but since Somalia started the game with a Besieged Regime marker, only one success needed to be rolled in order to successfully shift the Governance to Islamist Rule (see 8.4.3.2) so the operation is a success!

Mark Somalia with an Islamist Rule Governance marker and shift its Alignment to "Adversary." Remove the "Besieged Regime" marker. Next, move the "Jihadist Resources" marker from the '0' to the '1' box on the Victory track. Finally, increase the Jihadist Funding by the Resource value of the country that has just been shifted to Islamist Rule—in this case the Funding goes up from '8' to '9.'



That concludes our illustrated tutorial of Labyrinth. While we were able to introduce you to nearly all of the rules of the game, there were a few rules we were not able to integrate in this Tutorial. The following rules sections were not addressed and we do encourage you to read them before continuing play: rules sections 1, 2, 3, and 4.5, 4.6, and 4.8.

At this point I encourage players to continue playing the game from this point:

- Find and discard *GTMO* which was used for this turn's Major Jihad in Somalia.
- Draw 8 cards for the US and 8 cards for the Jihadists.
- Continue playing from this point so as to build upon what was learned.
- Most importantly: have fun!

## 1-PLAYER EXAMPLE OF PLAY

This run through the first full turn of a 1-player game demonstrates aspects of *solitaire play* covered in rules section 9. It presumes some familiarity (from the preceding example or from 2-player play) with rules sections 1-8. An inset on page 12 provides a separate sample implementation of the Radicalization process.

### Set Up

A solitaire player selects and sets up the “Let’s Roll!” scenario (2001-?) and selects the “Campaign” play length (three decks). Both player aid sheets are set nearby, with one of them open for easy reference to the “Jihadist Activities” flowcharts. The player opts to attempt the “Jihadist Ideology Potent” increased difficulty level (9.7) and not to use the optional deck-division rule. The player represents the US side and deals the opening hands of 9 cards each, dealing the Jihadist hand as a face-down pile (9.2).

The US side receives: *NEST*, *Sanctions*, *Al-Azhar*, *Intel Community*, *Enhanced Measures*, *Patriot Act*, *Renditions*, *Abu Sayyaf*, and *Ex-KGB*. The player may not inspect the Jihadists’ cards. (If you would like to set up the example and follow along, the face-down Jihadist hand is, top to bottom: *Back Channel*, *Wahhabism*, *Amerithrax*, *Tora Bora*, *Safer Now*, “*Axis of Evil*”, *GTMO*, *Musharraf*, and *FATA*).


### First Jihadist Action Phase

**Card 1:** The player flips the top card of the Jihadist hand to reveal *Back Channel* [3-US]. Following along the “Event or OPS?” flowchart (9.4.1), the event is not a playable non-US event nor a playable US event (it is a US event with a precondition—“US Soft”—that is not met). The next box on the flowchart asks whether Major Jihad success is possible: it is not; there are four cells massed in Afghanistan, but that country is already at Islamist Rule. Per the next box, the player checks if (Minor) Jihad is possible in any Good or Fair country: it is not; there are no cells in any countries at



Good or Fair. The next box asks if cells are Available: they are; there are 11 cells on the track, and Funding is “Ample”. *GTMO* is not in effect, so the Operation will be Recruit. Checking the “Recruit” flowchart under “Where?”, there is no Regime Change country but there is an Islamist Rule country with cells fewer than twice the card’s OPS value—Afghanistan (4 < 6). Because Jihadist Ideology is Potent, (in addition to the easing of requirements for Major Jihad) each of the card’s three OPS place not just one but two available cells, resulting in automatic placement of six sleeper cells from the Funding track into Afghanistan, to a total of 10 cells there.

**Card 2:** The player flips the next Jihadist card, which is *Wahhabism* [3-Jihadist]. The card is a playable



non-US event—there is no precondition, and the event is not blocked. Following the flowchart, the event does not Recruit or place cells, so it is played. It is not an Unassociated event (it is Jihadist-associated), so nothing else happens. Because Funding is already at the maximum “9”, the Wahhabism event has no effect.

*COMMENT: The Jihadists have made prompt use of Taliban Afghanistan as a training ground while available, but were the beneficiaries of Wahhabist donations at a moment when they were already flush with cash after the spectacular attacks on the US Homeland.*

### First US Action Phase


**Card 1:** The player plays *Intel Community* [2-US] for the event. The player inspects the face-down Jihadist hand, careful not to disturb their order (9.2). The player now knows what events are coming and in what order. The player uses the event’s 1 OP for Reserves and opts not to play an extra card.



**Card 2:** The player selects *Abu Sayyaf* [2-Jihadist] plus the 1 Reserves for a Regime Change deployment of six troops from the Troops Track to Afghanistan.

- A Governance roll of “2” sets Afghanistan to Poor.
- A Prestige roll of “5” followed by rolls of “4” and “2” boosts US Prestige from “7” to “9”.

The card’s Jihadist-associated event occurs, testing the Philippines—it goes Soft—placing a cell and the “Abu Sayyaf” marker there, and removing the card from play.



*COMMENT: The US side shuts down the Taliban playground at once, realizing that Wahhabism will not help the jihadists already flush with cash after the spectacular attacks on the US Homeland. The player is holding a strong hand, but uses two weaker cards in a slower entry into Afghanistan, hoping to gain insight into the Jihadists’ plans and clear the decks for the new Afghan war.*

### Second Jihadist Action Phase

**Card 1:** The player flips the next Jihadist card, which is *Amerithrax* [2-Jihadist]; the Jihadist-associated event is playable and occurs: the player randomly discards a card from the US hand, in this case *Enhanced Measures*.

**Card 2:** The next Jihadist card is *Tora Bora* [2]. Per “Event or OPS?”, the player checks if the event is a playable non-US event: it is. The event does not Recruit or place a cell, so it occurs regardless of cells on the Funding track. Because it is an Unassociated event, its OPS-value also will be used (9.4.1).



Implementing the event first, the player removes two cells from Afghanistan to the track (bringing total cells there down to 8) and rolls Prestige: rolls of “3” then “1” and “5” result in a 1-point drop in US Prestige to “8”. The player then draws a card to place face-down on top of the Jihadist hand. (Unknownst to the player, the card is *Ansar Al-Islam*.)

The player now continues along the “Event or OPS?” flowchart to implement the Unassociated event card’s 2 OPS. Major Jihad success is almost possible in Afghanistan (8 cells – 6 troops = 2; 3+ is needed for Jihad at Ideology Potent). Nor is Jihad possible in any Good or Fair country (since Philippines is non-Muslim). Cells are available, so the OPS will be Recruit.



The first box on the Recruit flowchart does not apply, since there are not 5+ more troops than cells in Afghanistan, the only Regime Change country. Nor is there an Islamist Rule country, the second box. For the third box, however, Philippines (alone) meets the need, because it has a cell in it already so is a possible Recruit locale, and it is not Islamist Rule nor Regime Change. The player rolls two dice: Recruit will succeed on a roll of “3” or less; rolls of “3” and “6” result in two cells being added to Philippines (9.7).

*Tora Bora* is removed from the game.

### Second US Action Phase

**Cards 1 & 2:** The player now could use *Renditions* to discard the newly drawn Jihadist card (9.2), but decides to wait and take advantage of the insight gained from *Intel Community* to go after one of the Jihadists’ powerful events. The player instead prepares a one-two punch to jihadist Funding, playing *Patriot Act* [3-US] and then *Sanctions* [1-US], intending to follow up with *Al-Azhar* next Action Phase. *Patriot Act* is removed, and Funding drops to “7”.

*COMMENT: The jihadist insurgency in the Philippines is growing, but the US side still has its work cut out for it in Afghanistan.*




### Third Jihadist Action Phase

**Card 1:** The player next turns up *Ansar al-Islam* [2-Jihadist], a playable non-US event that does place a cell. Since the Funding Track still holds cells, the event occurs rather than “Radicalization”. The choice of countries for cell placement (between Iraq and Iran) is random (9.4.2.1), and a 50-50 die roll determines that the cell goes into Iraq. *Ansar al-Islam* is removed.

**Card 2:** The next flip reveals *Safer Now* [3-US]. Following “Event or OPS?”, the event is not non-US but rather a playable US event, so the OPS will be used to Plot and the event ignored. Since Jihadist play never triggers US-associated events (9.4.1), the card can be discarded normally rather than placed in the “1st Plot” box.

Turning to the Plot flow chart, no plotting is possible in the United States; Prestige is not Low; and Abu Sayyaf is in effect and at least as many cells as troops are in the Philippines, so Philippines is the first Plot target. Since there are enough cells there to use all three OPS, the flow chart need not be further consulted. The three cells in the Philippines go Active and roll “3”, “3”, and “4”. The player sighs in relief that all those Moro jihadists failed to get a terror plot in train!




### Third US Action Phase

**Card 1:** The time has come for *Renditions* [3-US] to prevent the Jihadists from exploiting “Axis of Evil” and thereby potentially sink US Prestige. The player uses the US event to Disrupt two Active cells in Afghanistan, returning them to the track and raising Prestige to “9”, and to discard “Axis of Evil” from the top of the Jihadist hand (9.2). The “Rendition” marker is added to the Event box.

**Card 2:** The player follows up with *Al-Azhar* [2-US] for the event. Egypt is unmarked and tests to Poor Neutral. Funding drops from “8” to “4” and thus from “Ample” to “Moderate”.

*COMMENT: The combination of inept plotters in Southeast Asia, US Treasury action, and condemnation of the 9/11 attacks by mainstream Islamic scholars has taken a big bite out of donations to jihadists.*





## Fourth Jihadist Action Phase

**Card 1:** The next Jihadist card is *GTMO* [3], a playable non-US event. The event occurs, yielding a Prestige roll: “1” and then “4” and “6” sinks US Prestige to “4”, at the bottom of “Medium”.

*GTMO* is an Unassociated event, so the player follows “Event or OPS?” to check for Major Jihad success or Jihad in Good or Fair possibilities—there are none. No cells are Available, because Funding is too low (and even if there were, *GTMO* is in effect, 9.4.1), so the card’s three OPS will be used for Travel.



To implement the Travel, the player begins with the “Travel To:” flowchart to designate the destinations or each of the three cells to Travel before making any of the attempts (9.4.2.6).

For the first cell, the first box indicates a non-Islamist Rule country with either Regime Change, Besieged Regime, or Aid. Both Afghanistan (Regime Change) and Somalia (Besieged Regime) qualify, so the player consults the white “Travel To Priorities” box (9.4.2, 9.4.2.6). The first Priority is Travel to Pakistan, which is not one of the qualifying countries. The next Priority is by “Highest Resource”. Both Afghanistan and Somalia are Resource “1”, so are tied for Priority. The player assigns each country an equal die roll range (9.5), 1-3 for Afghanistan and 4-6 for Somalia. A roll of “6” yields Somalia as the destination for the first cell to Travel.

For the second cell to Travel, the next (second) box indicates selecting a country at Poor where Major Jihad would be possible if two cells were added. Under Potent Ideology (9.7), only three more cells

than troops would be required, so Iraq (with one cell and no troops) barely qualifies, while Afghanistan (with six cells and six troops) barely does not. The second cell will attempt Travel to Iraq.

For the third cell to Travel, the next box indicates a Muslim country at Good or Fair with a cell adjacent. The candidates are Syria, Gulf States, and Pakistan—all Muslim countries at Fair; Syria and Gulf States have a cell adjacent in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Checking the white Priorities box again, the Travel To Priority is Pakistan.

Having determined the three destinations for the three cells to attempt Travel (Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan), the player consults the “Travel From:” flow chart to determine the origin country or countries for Travelling cells (9.4.2.6.1). There are no Islamist Rule countries, nor any Regime Change countries where cells outnumber troops, so the first box that applies is “Adjacent country” and the next is “Random, including destination”.

Somalia has no cell adjacent, so the first cell’s origin will be a randomly selected country. There are three possibilities (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Philippines). Checking “Travel From Priorities”, the highest priority is “Has Active Cells”—true for Afghanistan and Philippines but not Iraq (the second Priority, “Not another destination”, would similarly disqualify only Iraq). Another equal-range die roll between Afghanistan and Philippines yields Afghanistan as the origin for Travel to Somalia.

The second destination, Iraq, similarly has no cell adjacent. A die roll between Afghanistan and Philippines again yields Afghanistan as the origin country.

The third destination, Pakistan, does have cells adjacent, in Afghanistan, so Afghanistan will be the origin.

The player now conducts the Travel of the three cells. Somalia is Unmarked and is tested to be Poor Neutral. A roll of “2” success-

## Radicalization Example (9.4.3)

It is the first Action Phase of a 1-player “Let’s Roll!” scenario at the basic Ideology level. The first Jihadist card revealed is *Iraqi WMD* [3-US]. It is a playable US event, so by the “Event or OP?” flow chart, the event is ignored and the 3 OPS used to Plot. Following along the entire “Where? Plot” flow chart, however, there is no country that meets the requirements (indeed, no country where a Plot operation could occur in general, since all cells on the map are in an Islamist Rule country). So the player ends up at the box marked “Radicalization”, and all three OPS will be used as listed in the green Radicalization box near the top right of the sheet.

- Per the Radicalization box, the first of the three OPS automatically places one cell into a random country if the Funding track has any cells, which it does. The player rolls one tan and one black die; rolls of “1” and “3”, respectively, yield the instruction “Roll Schengen”. The player rolls another die and consults the Schengen table; a roll of “5” yields “Spain”. The player puts a Sleeper cell into Spain and tests its Posture.
- Next, the second unused OP will automatically Travel one cell per the Travel flow charts. The “Travel To:” flowchart reminds the player that, for Radicalization, the first box consulted is the one indicating the destination of a Poor country where Major Jihad would be possible with the addition of two cells. No such

country currently exists, so the player checks the next box—Good or Fair Muslim country with a cell adjacent. Pakistan is a Fair Neutral with cells adjacent in Afghanistan, so it will be the destination. The first box of “Travel From:”—Islamist Rule with more cells than the OPS of the card—is fulfilled by Afghanistan, so a cell automatically Travels from Afghanistan to Pakistan. (Note that even non-adjacent Travel automatically succeeds if Radicalization causes the Travel.)


- The next bullet under Radicalization says to place a Plot if Funding is less than “9”. Funding equals 9, however, so the player goes on to the fourth bullet.
- The final Radicalization bullet specifies that each remaining OPS point (there is only one OPS point remaining) automatically worsens the Governance by one level of a randomly selected Muslim country at Good or Fair. (No Priority is applied.) The candidates are Syria, Gulf States, and Pakistan. The player designates even-chance rolls of 1-2 for Syria, 3-4 Gulf States, and 5-6 Pakistan. A roll of “1” worsens Syria from Fair Adversary to Poor Adversary.

*Iraqi WMD* is discarded, and the player continues with the second Jihadist card of the Action Phase.

fully Travels 1 Active cell to Somalia and makes it a Sleeper. A roll of “4” removes the cell from Afghanistan attempting to Travel into Iraq. The Travel by the third cell from Afghanistan to Pakistan is automatic, putting it in Pakistan as a Sleeper.

The player has finished implementing the event and operations from the *GTMO* card and so places it into a “Lapsing Events” card holding box.

**Card 2:** The second card of this Jihadist Action Phase is *Musharraf* [2]. The non-US event is playable (with the recent Travel to Pakistan) and places or Recruits no cells, so occurs. The cell in Pakistan is replaced by a cadre, and Pakistan is set to Poor Ally.



The Jihadists now receive the 2 OPS from the Unassociated event card. Again there are no Jihad possibilities. Two cells are Available in the “Moderate” Funding box, but *GTMO* remains in effect, so more Travel will be attempted.

For the first of the two cells, Regime Change Afghanistan (Resource 1) and Besieged Regime Somalia (also Resource 1) again tie for qualification; this time the random selection falls on Afghanistan as the first destination.

For the second cell to Travel, both Iraq and Somalia qualify because Major Jihad would be possible in either if two cells were added. The Priority of “Highest Resource” determines Iraq as the second destination.

Per “Travel From:”, both origin countries will be randomly selected. The Priority “Has Active cells” makes Afghanistan and Philippines equal candidates for Travel to Afghanistan (which—regarding the second Priority bullet—is the same, not “another,” destination). An equal-chance roll determines that the Travel will be within Afghanistan. The Priority on “Not another destination” determines that Philippines will be the origin of Travel to Iraq.

One Active cell in Afghanistan becomes a Sleeper. One cell in Philippines attempts Travel to Iraq; on a roll of “6”, it is removed.

*Musharraf* is discarded.

#### Fourth (Final) US Action Phase

**Card 1:** The player decides to play *NEST* [1-US] for the event, placing the “NEST” event marker in the US space and removing the card.




**Card 2:** The US side’s last card is *Ex-KGB* [2-Jihadist], which the player decides to play now to Disrupt in Philippines in order to minimize chances of Prestige-damaging plots there. The Disrupt operation in Soft Philippines removes one Active cell, leaving one Active cell still there.

The Jihadist event *Ex-KGB* is playable and now triggers. *Ex-KGB* is one of a handful of events that have unique instructions for imple-

mentation (9.6). According to the individual event instruction, *Ex-KGB*’s effects target Caucasus if that would shift the “World Posture” marker, otherwise Central Asia. Since there is no “CTR” marker in Russia, and since setting Caucasus (currently Unmarked) to “Soft” would indeed shift the World marker (from “0” to “Soft 1”), *Ex-KGB* sets Caucasus to Soft and is discarded.


#### Fifth (Final) Jihadist Action Phase

**Card 1:** The player turns up the last Jihadist card, *FATA*. It is a playable non-US event; it does place a cell, so the “Event or OPS?” flow chart next asks whether the Funding track has a cell, which it does. The event is played, placing a cell in Pakistan, removing the cadre there, and placing the “FATA” event marker in the country space.



#### End of Turn

No other cards remain, nor are there plots to be resolved, so the player has reached the end of the turn. Funding decreases by one from “4” to “3”—now at “Tight”. *GTMO* Lapses and is discarded.



With troops at “War” and Funding at “Tight” level, the US side receives eight cards and the Jihadists seven. The player deals the Jihadist cards into a new face-down hand and the US cards as a face-up hand and begins another turn.

*COMMENT: The turn has been generally a good one for the US. After an initial burst, jihadist recruiting failed to keep pace with US disruption, and several cells were wrapped up as they attempted to scatter from occupied Afghanistan. Without any successful terrorist attacks to answer the Western response to 9/11, extremist finances are dangerously low. But footholds for the Jihad in Somalia, Iraq, and a FATA sanctuary in Pakistan bode ill for the West for the coming year, particularly with jihadist ideology potent.*

*And any progress that the US can point to remains tactical not strategic. While the extremists lost their Islamist sanctuary in Afghanistan, Muslim governance otherwise remains unimpressive. The effort in Afghanistan to hunt down al-Qaeda’s foot soldiers has been laggardly, and the non-Muslim world after initial sympathy for military action is gradually lining up against aggressive use of US “hard power”.*

*The player has some breathing room—some plots will have to go off if the jihadists are to recruit to restore their numbers. The player will have to use that respite for diplomatic and military efforts to raise sagging US prestige to have a chance of eventually resolving the Afghan situation. Meanwhile, the player will have to keep one eye on potential jihads in Iraq, Somalia, and especially Pakistan—each problematic to defend for different reasons.*

## GUIDE TO OPERATIONS

### How Do I Get Where I Want to Go?

This section provides a quick guide to the use of Labyrinth's variety of operations to achieve specific goals for the US and jihadist players.

## For the US Player

### How do I develop Good governance?

The main way to improve Governance is to conduct War of Ideas operations. Success usually will require both your Prestige and GWOT Relations to be up to snuff. A country must first be an Ally before War of Ideas will improve its Governance. In a Regime Change country, you'll have to have at least five more troops than cells to attempt War of Ideas. Some events—such as *Mass Turnout* in a Regime Change country—improve Governance in certain circumstances or place Aid that will help the success of War of Ideas.

### How do I raise US Prestige?

The easiest way to add to Prestige is to conduct Disrupt operations in countries with 2 or more troops. You also can attempt War of Ideas in non-Muslim countries: if the result is the same Posture as that of the United States, Prestige increases. If World Posture is at the end of the scale (“3”) and the same as US Posture, Prestige grows at the end of each turn. Finally, a few events add to or roll Prestige. A lucky Prestige roll, such as with *Tora Bora* or *GTMO* or, more radically, by triggering a jihadist event such as “*Axis of Evil*”, will bump up Prestige.

### How do I remedy a GWOT relations penalty?

Flipping a few countries from the opposite Posture to the same Posture as the United States should do it. Target countries of the opposite Posture with War of Ideas operations. This will be easier if the US is at Soft. A more radical solution is to change US Posture to match World Posture, using a Reassessment operation. There are events—such as *Tony Blair*—that allow you to set or roll certain countries' Posture and others—for example, *Safer Now*—that roll or reset US Posture.

### How do I turn a Muslim Neutral or Adversary into an Ally?

Successful War of Ideas shifts a Neutral to Ally—a step that is necessary before further War of Ideas can improve its Governance. Shifting an Adversary is among the most difficult objectives to accomplish, because War of Ideas may not target Adversaries. A Regime Change (Deploy) operation shifts an Adversary to Ally but is only allowed in an Islamist Rule country or with the *Iraq WMD* and *Libya WMD* events. A few events shift Alignment directly—*Covert Action* and *Back Channel* can shift an Adversary.

### How do I overturn Islamist Rule?

The principal way is Regime Change—a special kind of Deploy operation that requires a US Hard Posture and six troops. The Regime Change will reset the country to either Poor or Fair Ally. A number of events—*Musharraf*, *Former Soviet Union*, *Kemalist Republic*, *Ethiopia Strikes*, and others—set or reset Governance, which undoes Islamist Rule in the specific country affected by the event.

### How do I kill cells?

Disrupt operations with troops or in Ally or non-Muslim countries remove Active cells to the Funding track or make Sleeper cells Active so that a follow-up Disrupt can remove them. A range of event cards—*Predator*, *Special Forces*, *Hizballah*, *Iran*, *Jaysh al-Mahdi* and others—enable you to select cells for removal even if they are Sleepers.

### How do I choke off jihadist Funding?

Events—*Sanctions*, *Al-Azhar*, *Bin Ladin*, and many others—are available to subtract Funding. They are more effective or more often playable if there are no Islamist Rule countries on the map. Also, you can conduct Alert operations to remove Plots, which are the main jihadist means of boosting Funding that otherwise drops at the end of each turn.

### What can I do about a Besieged Regime?

Not too much. Improving the country's Governance to Good, if it is not at Good already, will remove the Besieged Regime marker. The *Sharia* event removes one Besieged Regime marker from anywhere.

### How do I protect the United States against WMD attack?

The jihadists do not start with WMD, so the first step is trying to prevent them from getting any. That means removing any cells hanging around in Russia or Central Asia and improving Central Asian Governance; playing the *CTR* event if US is Soft; and defending Pakistan against Major Jihad by removing cells from there, improving its Governance, and getting *Benazir Bhutto* in play if possible. If cells start showing up in the United States, and particularly if the jihadists have acquired WMD, you may need to remove those cells to prevent them from plotting and to Alert against any plots placed there. The *Patriot Act* event will make it harder for cells to get to the United States, *NEST* will make it easier for you to Alert against WMD there, and *Wiretapping* removes all cells, plots, and Cadre there.

## For the Jihadist Player

### How do I establish Islamist Rule?

A successful Major Jihad operation is the only way. You can first use Minor Jihads and plots to bring the target country's Governance down to Poor, where Islamist Rule is only one step away. If a full-blown Major-Jihad effort fails, a Besieged Regime results, making a follow-up effort easier. Or you can use events that place Besieged Regime markers, like *Saleh* or *Darfur*, to soften up a target and then move cells in. Somalia begins the game as a Besieged Regime.

### How do I spur Funding?

Your main source of funding is terror plots, particularly plots in non-Muslim and Good countries. A WMD attack in a non-Muslim country will top off funding, as will assistance from *Saddam* via that event. *Wahhabism* provides money from Saudi donors. A successful shift of a country to Islamist Rule provides a one-time Funding boost.



## How do I block the spread of Good governance?

Both Minor Jihad and Plot operations can worsen Governance toward Poor and remove Aid that helps War of Ideas.

- Each successful Jihad roll immediately worsens Governance toward Poor and eliminates an Aid marker, but a failure removes a cell.
- Plotting is safer but can be undone by US Alert operations. A Plot has to make it through a US Action Phase without being Alerted or otherwise removed. The plot then goes off, enabling you to roll dice equal to its Plot number (or three dice if WMD)—successes worsen Governance and remove Aid.

Shifting a country's Alignment toward Adversary will delay or block improvement of Governance via US War of Ideas. Keeping enough cells in a Regime Change country will block War of Ideas there. More globally, reducing US Prestige and imposing a GWOT Relations penalty can stymie the US War of Ideas.

## How do I hurt US Prestige?

The primary attack on Prestige is to set off terrorist plots in countries that host troops. Also, many events lower Prestige, particularly if there are Islamist Rule countries on the map. Events, such as “*Axis of Evil*”, *Tora Bora*, and *GTMO* cause Prestige rolls, which tend to drive Prestige down. *Abu Sayyaf* can enable you to hurt Prestige just by placing plots in the Philippines, in addition to any damage if the plots go off. Finally, Islamist Rule that anywhere survives the turn will hurt Prestige.

## How do I mess up US GWOT relations?

Targeting non-Muslim countries already of like Posture as the United States with terror plots causes Posture rolls that can throw off US GWOT relations. This tactic is most effective within the EU, where each plot that goes off causes Posture rolls in two additional countries. Events like *Schroeder & Chirac* and *Ex-KGB* can set or shift Posture to your advantage.

## How can I scare off Aid?

Each successful Jihad roll worsens Governance toward Poor and eliminates an Aid marker; a Major Jihad that results in Islamist Revolution (shift to Islamist Rule) removes all Aid. A Plot that goes off can remove Aid and worsen Governance. The *Foreign Fighters* event removes 1 Aid marker from a Regime Change country.

## How do I turn a US Ally to Neutral or Adversary?

Alignment is difficult for you to affect. Events such as *Al-Jazeera*, *Abu Ghurayb*, *Leak*, or *Kashmir* shift countries to Neutral or even Adversary. Former Soviet Union sets Central Asia to Neutral.

## How do I spread Poor governance?

Just Traveling to or placing cells by event into unmarked countries will tend to increase the number of countries under Poor Governance. Minor Jihad and Plots can worsen Governance to Poor, as can many events such as *Iran*, *Jaysh al-Mahdi*, *Ijtihad*, *Musharraf*, and *Former Soviet Union*.

## How do I acquire WMD, and what is it good for?

Three events—*HEU*, *Kazakh Strain*, and *Loose Nuke*—provide shots at acquiring a WMD in either Russia or Central Asia. Prepositioning cells in those countries can put the US player in the position of

allowing you a chance at WMD or having to discard any of those cards—and the worse the Governance in Central Asia, the better your chance. The fall of Pakistan to Islamist Rule immediately provides you three WMD plot markers, and worsening Central Asian Governance or establishing Islamist Rule there improves your chances of finding wayward WMD there. If a WMD plot goes off where there are US Troops or in a non-Muslim country, its effects on Prestige or Funding and Posture, respectively, is greater than an ordinary plot. If one goes off in the United States, you win the game.

## DESIGN NOTES

### Volko Ruhnke

*[This is] going to be a long cold-war-like struggle to strengthen the forces of moderation and weaken the forces of violent intolerance.... There is no war on “terrorism” that does not address the misgovernance and pervasive sense of humiliation in the Muslim world.*

Thomas L. Friedman  
“War of Ideas, Part 5”  
The New York Times  
January 22, 2004

*Labyrinth's* family tree stands on Mark Herman's original card-driven game (CDG), *We The People*. Just as my earlier, operational-level card-driven design, *Wilderness War*, had a model in Mark Simonitch's CDG, *Hannibal*, *Labyrinth* draws inspiration from Jason Matthews's and Ananda Gupta's masterful strategic-level CDG, *Twilight Struggle*.

*Labyrinth* began in a conversation with Gene Billingsley at Consim EXPO 2009, in which Gene suggested a design covering the current struggle with Islamic extremism. I have been sympathetic to the contemporary comparison between the West's ideological struggle with the jihadists and the East-West struggle of the Cold War, so the idea of a *Twilight Struggle*-esque game dealing with our generation's global contest occurred immediately, and work on what became *Labyrinth* was soon underway.

But TS fans will have a whole new game to master here: the only mechanic that *Labyrinth* borrows in whole cloth is TS's (brilliant) triggering of opposing events by play of operations. Countries, operations, victory all must work differently in *Labyrinth* to portray a very different conflict.

What is it all about? A particular design challenge with *Labyrinth's* topic is that it straddles history recorded only recently and history yet to be made. What do the Islamists want—what is their “win”? What does US victory look like? How will the contest end?

The game's response to these questions—and its central premise—is that the “War on Terror” is really about governance of the Muslim world: that competent, accountable government will offer Islamic populations the future that they desire and thereby drain extremism of its energy. That jihadism roots in the abysmal quality of governance in many Muslim countries. And that global jihadists seek to take advantage of that poor governance to spur Muslim populations to opt for their vision of Islamist rule. *Labyrinth's* victory conditions, the way it tracks the status of countries in the conflict, and its core mechanics—jihadist operations, in particular—seek to portray that premise.

Dealing with a history that is not yet fully written means imagining outcomes that right now may seem extreme. As I write in 2010, there are no Taliban-style Islamist regimes ruling whole coun-

tries—though parts of Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia have at various times since 2001 suffered under such rule—and Bin Ladin looks to be a long way from his objective of a pan-Islamic Caliphate. Nor has democracy spread across the Islamic world (even if governance in Iraq and Afghanistan, for all its shortcomings, is far better than it was as of 2001). But a simulation must incorporate the objectives of the protagonists as they envisioned them, so either outcome must be within the players' reach in the game.

By the same token, alternative routes to victory in the game account for the perspectives of the sides' historical counterparts. Jihadist use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States would have unpredictable political effects—but it is *al-Qaeda's* grand strategy to inflict so much damage on the US that it will withdraw its support of secular Muslim regimes and thus allow the “true” Muslims to rise up. So in the game, the jihadist side is rewarded with a win for inflicting mass destruction on US soil.

Why a win for WMD only in the US and not elsewhere? Because, in the global jihadists' worldview, the United States is the real power that stands in Islam's way. Bin Ladin in his 1998 declaration of global jihad focuses on Americans as the enemy, listing US offenses in Muslim lands, calling upon Muslims “to kill Americans and plunder their possessions” wherever and whenever possible, and only then adding a call to attack “the armies of the American devils ... and those who are allied with them.” WMD attack on another world capital would be a terrible tragedy—and in the game can reward the jihadist side handsomely—but *al-Qaeda* has no reason to expect that such an event would knock out its main perceived enemy.

Similarly, the disruption of all existing jihadist networks would not end the ideological struggle that is upon the world—new extremist recruits and organizations in time would emerge. But sufficient over the long term or not, US strategy has set the elimination of *al-Qaeda* and allied leaders as a goal, and success would at least dampen the threat for a time and provide room for progress in relations between Islam and West. So the game forces the jihadist player to ensure that some cells always survive somewhere on the map.

## Asymmetry

A key difference in simulating the “War on Terror” compared to, for example, the Cold War is the asymmetrical nature of the current conflict. The US and the Soviets used fairly similar means against one another, but terrorist and counterterrorist tactics differ so starkly that the distinct tactics themselves are used as terms for the opposing sides. Therefore, game mechanics in *Labyrinth*—in contrast to those in most CDGs—present entirely different operational choices for the US and jihadist players, respectively.

A few words explaining what the details of those “ops” mechanics represent may be warranted:

**Why are most US OPS automatic and most Jihadist OPS by die roll?** The US has the resources and organization to achieve just about any tactical objective, if it concentrates upon it. Jihadists typically operate on a shoestring in hostile environments, so almost any activity poses risk.

**Why do GWOT relations have such a big impact on War of Ideas?** The exercise of diplomacy, advice, aid and other forms of “soft power” in the Muslim world rely heavily for effectiveness on moral authority and international coordination, and US isolation in the world over its tactics—whether because the US is viewed as too harsh or, less likely, not assertive enough—undermines such authority and coordination.

**As the US player, why can't I freely choose my own posture?** In the parlance of the age, you go to war with the Administration you have, not the Administration you'd wish to have. Posture represents not just a single leader's decisions, but what other politicians, the media, and the citizenry will support—shifting those gears calls for a time-consuming and costly national conversation.

**Why do jihadists have to have a cell or cadre to recruit a cell?** Recruiting means outreach by somebody, usually locally. Even under a supporting regime, recruiting and readying operatives requires trainers.

**Why does plotting raise funds and often allow jihadists to ignore US events?** Terrorism is an effective attention-getter and attention-distracter: Sponsors will lose interest in you if you don't keep grabbing headlines; and the headlines can divert the world from whatever else it is working on.

**Why can plotting hurt US prestige, governance, and aid?** Successful terrorism when US forces are present makes the US look helpless or even responsible for the carnage. Successful terrorism against a local regime can cause security-related overreaction that worsens governance. An insecure environment can constrain and even scare off aid organizations, foreign investment, and even official assistance.

**Why does a major jihad failure affect alignment?** Even a regime hostile to the US is more likely to take US help if the jihadists are gunning for the regime directly.

**Why does a shift to Islamist rule require two successful jihad rolls on a card?** It is always easier to mess up a system than to replace it with your own. The shift to Islamist rule represents not just a change in a regime's behavior or effectiveness but its replacement with something else.

## Making Lemonade

Finally, just a couple words on strategy. Great leaders have in common the ability to make lemonade out of lemons—to find opportunity in adversity. And great players must do the same in the game.

The key game mechanic of regime change, for example, is a two-way street. A powerful US ability to reverse jihadist gains, it also stretches Western resources. The jihadists have the opportunity to exploit the infidel occupation for recruitment and to pin the US down with its regime change commitments.

But to do so and thereby deny the US side gains in governance that enable further regime changes, the jihadists will have to commit resources of their own to fight the regime change battle. Remember the “flypaper” theory of the Iraq war: even an extended and troubled US-led occupation can draw in and destroy a lot of jihadists. And sustained and successful battle against the jihadists demonstrates Western strength that can win not love but leverage with Muslim authorities either through their self interest—because they seek to end the day on the winning side of the regional struggle—or through ideology—because Islam forbids a jihad when the Muslims are too weak to win.

Similarly, the occurrence of an opponent's event in the game is not always an entirely bad thing: the timing and conditions of an opponent's triggered events can have major impact. Combinations in the cards that can turn enemy events to your advantage are many—Your mission is to play *Labyrinth* and ferret them out!

## EVENT CARD BACKGROUND

**1. Backlash:** With the vast majority of jihadist terror occurring in Muslim countries, it is perhaps inevitable that most victims of the jihad are Muslim. Less inevitable has been the Muslim street's reaction to that fact. This event represents instances of revulsion toward Muslims killing each other.

**2. Biometrics:** In the race between international regimes to control borders and block terrorist travel and extremist efforts to forge passports and otherwise circumvent controls, the international community deployed a variety of technologies to aid rapid and reliable physical recognition of travelers.

**3. CTR:** Cooperative Threat Reduction and a range of related post-Cold War programs were intended to make US resources available to former Soviet states for the safe disposition of their inherited WMD stockpiles. Following 9/11, some saw CTR as a way to help prevent terrorist acquisition of such weapons. Concerns over mismanagement and US wariness of subsidizing Russian military capability, however, kept the programs controversial.

**4. Moro Talks:** (2003) On again, off again talks between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front gradually involved the MILF in a process that reinforced the separatist—but not global jihadist—group's desire to disentangle its local cause from Abu Sayyaf terrorism. The event presumes a dedicated MILF effort to deny Abu Sayyaf sanctuary.

**5. NEST:** (2002) The US Energy Department's Nuclear Emergency Support Team (formerly Search Team)—personnel trained and equipped to find and deal with a wayward nuclear weapon—focused increasingly after 9/11 on the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Meanwhile, the US undertook Homeland Security measures to detect nuclear materials entering the country and the Centers for Disease Control and first responders increased preparedness against bioterrorism.

**6.&7. Sanctions:** The US Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence undertakes intelligence and enforcement against the financial activities of US adversaries, including facilitators of terrorism. One of its principal tools is a list of designated entities—such as Muslim charities suspected of acting as Islamist funding conduits—barred from US commerce.

**8.-10. Special Forces:** Widely deployed in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, US and other Western special forces provide a potent capability to work with local forces to search out militant cells in country and, potentially, to deny them sanctuary across national borders.

**11. Abbas:** (2003) Palestinian Authority Prime Minister in 2003 and then President in 2005, Mahmoud Abbas came to symbolize the pragmatic Palestinian counterpoint in the West Bank to the hardline HAMAS in Gaza. With Abbas as a partner, the US with Arab audiences could at least point to a peace process underway, even while HAMAS remained isolated.

**12. Al-Azhar:** Al-Azhar university in Cairo—the center of Sunni learning in the world and a preeminent source of religious edicts (*fatwa*, see event 97)—has stuck to its moderate tradition and broadly condemned 9/11, the killing of civilians through terror attacks in Iraq, and the use of mosques to preach violence.

**13. Anbar Awakening:** (2005) Weary of jihadist totalitarianism, Sunni tribal sheikhs in western Iraq banded into an anti-*al-Qaeda* movement to undo what had been close to a jihadist sanctuary. The

event guarantees that better governance in Iraq or Syria will aid US disruption operations there.

**14. Covert Action:** As they did in the Cold War, Western intelligence services in limited instances can reach into adversaries' governments through agents of influence to moderate if not reverse policies bearing on the war on terror.

**15. Ethiopia Strikes:** (2006) With tacit international support, Ethiopian military intervention in 2006 helped forestall Islamist defeat of Somalia's weak Transitional Federal Government. Introduction in 2009 of an African Union assistance force enabled Ethiopian troops to withdraw. Although Ethiopian intervention in Sudan is more fanciful, fighting along that border has not been unknown.

**16. Euro-Islam:** (2004) As the continent's millions of Muslim residents sought a peaceful coexistence, European Muslim thinkers such as Tariq Ramadan became influential as sources both of interfaith engagement and moderation within Islam. From the other end of the spectrum of tolerance, an extremist's murder of a Dutchman who made a film about Muslim abuse of women shocked secular Europeans and drew world attention to critique of fundamentalism.

**17. FSB:** Russia's security services, particularly its internal *Federalnaya sluzhba besopastnosti*, retained much of the zeal and call on resources of their Soviet KGB predecessor. With Russia just coming out of its grim struggle with Chechen separatists—whom Moscow viewed as international jihadists—and self-conscious of its bleeding by Afghan mujahidin in the 1980s, the services posed a severe risk for any extremist cell seeking to work in the former Soviet space.

**18. Intel Community:** Following 9/11, US intelligence resources devoted to counterterrorism and understanding the Muslim world burgeoned, while structural reforms sought to break down barriers between US intelligence and law enforcement agencies that *post mortems* found had contributed to the 2001 disaster.

**19. Kemalist Republic:** Turkey mixes a politically active military defending secular rule with increasing democratic openness to Islamic consciousness. Toss in NATO membership and a strong desire to qualify for the EU, and Turkish development is unlikely to go to radical extremes.

**20. King Abdullah:** Reputedly descended from the Prophet and inheriting the respect earned by his long-reigning father, the Sandhurst-educated Hashemite King of Jordan wields influence beyond his realm's meager resources and serves as a credible moderate interlocutor between West and Middle East.

**21. "Let's Roll!":** Named for Flight 93 hero Todd Beamer's last recorded words as the passengers stormed their 9/11 hijackers and prevented an attack on the US capital, the event represents similar if less dramatic cases in which the foiling of terror inspires others to take courage against extremism.

**22. Mossad & Shin Bet:** With reach into neighboring Arab states developed over decades of defense against military and terrorist attack, Israel's security services can be expected to strike hard against any perceived terrorist threats.

**23.-25. Predator:** Unmanned surveillance drones armed with Hellfire missiles enable the US to strike precision targets in denied areas without risk to friendly servicemen.



- 26. Quartet:** (2003-?) A new US push for peace between Palestinians and Israel coincided with the invasion of Iraq; the Arab street remained unimpressed.
- 27. Saddam Captured:** (2003) US forces caught up with the erstwhile Iraqi dictator nine months into Operation Iraqi Freedom, hiding in a spider hole near his home town of Tikrit with \$750,000. At least a moral victory for US forces, the impact of his capture on Sunni resistance to occupation was longer in coming.
- 28. Sharia:** While *Sharia*—Islamic law—is a popular concept among Muslims, its specific implementation is not universal. Radical dictates from fundamentalists in territory that they control can clash with local custom, modernity, or secularism to fuel resistance to jihad.
- 29. Tony Blair:** (2002-2007) Beyond committing major forces alongside the US to the invasion of Iraq, the British Prime Minister tirelessly and compellingly laid out for fellow Europeans and the world the need to stand fast against the threat of religious extremism.
- 30. UN Nation Building:** (??) A major UN mission into Iraq had the potential to bring international resources and prestige to bear in reconstruction, if not for event 56.
- 31. Wiretapping:** (2002-2005) Warrantless domestic surveillance by the US National Security Agency—instituted after 9/11 as a counterterrorism measure—once acknowledged generated substantial controversy over its legality and effectiveness.
- 32. Back Channel:** In the tradition of early US Cold-War negotiations with China, modern administrations have the option of secret diplomacy with pariahs in search of common interest against the jihadists.
- 33. Benazir Bhutto:** (2007) Whatever her faults as previous Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto used her popularity to simultaneously face down Musharraf's cling to power and any national temptation toward religious militancy. She thus promised a surge forward in legitimate and secular governance that the jihadists could not risk.
- 34. Enhanced Measures:** (2002-2004) While US intelligence and military use of “enhanced” interrogation measures on key *al-Qaeda* detainees remains highly controversial, the US Government held that approved measures were carefully monitored, never constituted torture, and produced valuable information that saved lives.
- 35. Hijab:** (2004) The effect of a French ban on religious apparel in public schools on the country's millions of Muslims sparked debate among Muslims and non-Muslims about individual religious rights. Global discussion of various governments' postures toward the head scarf—*hijab*—took on ostensibly liberal European governance, Turkish secular rule, and forced wearing of the *hijab* in Iran and elsewhere. After mass rallies, Ankara's parliament eventually relaxed a decades-long ban on the hijab on campuses. Counter-demonstrations followed, along with the constitutional court's intervention to restore the ban.
- 36. Indo-Pakistani Talks:** (2004) While few expected talks to resolve the key issue between the nuclear powers of Kashmir, the fact of the talks themselves showed that the *jihad* there no longer commanded Islamabad's highest attention.
- 37. Iraqi WMD:** (2002-2003) UN resolutions on Iraq and belief the world over that Saddam was in violation through continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction provided a case for US-led multinational overthrow of his regime—and perhaps a new beginning for governance of the Arab world.
- 38. Libyan Deal:** (2003) Eager for Western development and purchase of his nation's oil—and perhaps looking over his shoulder at the fate of fellow Arab pariah Saddam—Libya's Qaddafi finally decided to cash in his WMD chips.
- 39. Libyan WMD:** Perhaps more of a scenario that might have haunted Qaddafi than a serious prospect, the US might have used his WMD programs as a rationale or pretext for military action (if not for event 38).
- 40. Mass Turnout:** (2005) While some commentators have disputed the significance of elections in nation building—dismissing them as the form of democracy over its substance—the participation of over three-quarters of registered Iraqis in national legislative elections in early 2005 and the images of determined citizens holding up their ink-stained fingers despite insurgent threats to kill those who participated left no doubt that most Iraqis themselves saw democratization there as real.
- 41. NATO:** (2003) NATO command of a major portion of the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan led to an expansion of non-US forces there. The limitations that some countries placed on their forces initially meant that the US and a few key allies bore the brunt of operations against the Taliban jihad. But as fighting spread throughout the country, non-US forces often suffered substantial casualties in hard-fought actions against the extremist enemy.
- 42. Pakistani Offensive:** (2008, 2009) As militant operations increasingly penetrated into the heart of Pakistan and the growing pro-Taliban movement in the tribal areas appeared as much a threat to Pakistan as Karzai's Afghanistan and the Americans, Islamabad's army began off-and-on offensives into what had long been extremist sanctuaries.
- 43. Patriot Act:** (2001) The October 2001 USA Patriot Act expanded US domestic intelligence and law enforcement authorities, including in detaining immigrants suspected of terrorism. It also enhanced the Treasury's powers to regulate financial transactions involving foreigners.
- 44. Renditions:** (2002?-2005) While the US officially denied rendering terrorist suspects to countries known to torture, US “extraordinary renditions” once reported in media drew EU investigation and EU parliamentary condemnation.
- 45. Safer Now:** US observers rightly saw the many years that passed after 9/11 without another successful *al-Qaeda* strike against the Homeland as a major success. One hitch may have been that trumpeting that success could undermine public belief in the need for whatever counterterrorist policies had achieved it.
- 46. Sistani:** (2003-?) Internationally revered “quietist” Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani delayed and tempered sectarian violence in Iraq by counseling peace and patience. He also provided religious sanction to Shia participation in nascent democracy while Iraq remained under foreign occupation.
- 47.& 94. “The door of Ijtihad was closed”:** A Muslim saying referring to the completion hundreds of years ago of all interpretation of the Prophet's way (*Sunna*), it symbolizes the strong though not universal strain of fundamentalism in Sunni Islam. That sword of fundamentalism has two edges: it may lead extremists in tactically odd directions; it also may bar reform of Islamic government.

- 48. Adam Gadahn:** (2004) California-raised Azzam al-Amriki—an FBI Most Wanted Terrorist—serves as media-advisor to *al-Qaeda* and has appeared in several videos carrying the organization’s message to an English-speaking audience. *Al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula’s American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki later similarly seemed to serve as an inspiration for jihad from within the United States.
- 49. Al-Ittihad al-Islami:** (2006) AIAI (“Islamic Union”) under Hassan Dahir Aweys was one of the most important currents of militant Islamism in Somalia. It gave rise to the Islamic Courts Union, which captured most of Mogadishu and southern Somalia in 2006, until Ethiopian troops intervened (see event 15). Later, another organization—*Harakat al-Shibaab al-Mujahidin* (“Movement of Warrior Youth”)—emerged from the ICU to carry on the jihadist struggle in cooperation with *al-Qaeda*.
- 50. Ansar al-Islam:** (2004) Originally a small group of extremist Iraqi Kurds and Sunni Arabs in northern Iraq bent on Islamist rule over the country, AI (“Helpers of Islam”, later *Ansar al-Sunna*, “Protectors of the [Prophet’s] Way”,) after Operation Iraqi Freedom grew into *al-Qaeda*’s principal jihadist rival in the resistance. AI claimed numerous high-profile terrorist attacks against the Coalition and government, including a late-2004 suicide bombing of a US military dining facility that killed 22 soldiers.
- 51. FREs:** (2003-2008) When remnants of Saddam’s army (dubbed “Former Regime Elements” by the Coalition)—and disaffected Iraqis who joined them—maintained resistance to the US occupation, observers feared that the growing guerrilla army despite its secular Baathist roots would ally with and, through crossover, in effect recruit and train Iraqi jihadists.
- 52. IEDs:** (2004-2007) Simple-to-construct roadside or vehicle-born improvised explosive devices—often constructed from leftover munitions of Saddam’s army—became the bane of US patrols and convoys in Iraq.
- 53. Madrassas:** Muslim schools—whether the one-room *madrassa* of the border regions of Pakistan or the lavish “al-Mukmin” *pesantren* boarding school of Indonesia—often teach anti-Western or anti-Israeli extremism and violence along with the *Koran*. Sometimes prestigious, sometimes the only education available to poor families, *madrassas* threaten to ensure a follow-on generation of jihadists, whatever the fate of current terrorist organizations like *al-Qaeda*.
- 54. Moqtada al-Sadr:** (2004) Offspring of an esteemed Shia clerical family that had been horribly victimized by Saddam’s Sunni regime, the young Sadr became a powerful voice for Shia militancy in occupied Iraq. Targeting Coalition forces and Sunni Iraqis, Sadrism uprisings and reprisals challenged US efforts to dampen sectarianism, avert civil war, and establish a viable Iraqi government (see also event 106).
- 55. Uyghur Jihad:** (2002-2003) The US in 2002 designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement—an ethnic Uyghur group seeking independence and Islamist rule in western China—as terrorist. Beijing accused the group in the death of a Chinese diplomat in Central Asia that year. Pakistani forces killed its leader in late 2003. Its ties to *al-Qaeda* remain in dispute.
- 56. Vieira de Mello Slain:** (2003) Despite the absence of an express Security Council mandate for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the UN opted to participate in reconstruction, dispatching the highly effective Brazilian diplomat (and Secretary General Annan’s friend
- Sérgio Vieira de Mello. A car bomb—thought the work of the Zarqawi jihadist network, in August struck the UN’s Baghdad office, killing him. By November, the UN had scaled back its operations dramatically.
- 57. Abu Sayyaf:** (2002) US designation of this Filipino Islamist group as terrorist and suspicions of ties to *Jemaah Islamiya* and thus *al-Qaeda* contributed to US military involvement in the separatist struggle for the southern Philippine Islands. In light of the long history between the two countries, the event penalizes any US failure to commit to military protection of the Philippines’ territorial integrity.
- 58. Al-Anbar:** (2004-2005) Local support for the resistance in the predominantly Sunni province of al-Anbar in western Iraq helped jihadists establish a sanctuary of sorts. US military efforts—including hard fighting for the key city of Fallujah—contested the region, but not until local tribes turned on “*Al-Qaeda* in Iraq” were the jihadists forced to roost elsewhere.
- 59. Amerithrax:** (2001-2008) Delivery of what appeared to be sophisticated weaponized anthrax—a weapon of mass destruction—via the US Mail system beginning a week after 9/11 and into October 2001 led many observers to suspect *al-Qaeda* had carried out another attack on the US Homeland. The massive investigation led by the FBI consumed hundreds of thousands of agent man-hours. The Justice Department in 2008 ultimately announced its conclusion that a US Army scientist—who committed suicide before charges could be brought—acted alone.
- 60. Bhutto Shot:** (2007) Whether by the extremists’ strategic calculus or lower-level zeal, the assassination of reformist candidate Benazir Bhutto left a less potent slate of leaders to guide Pakistan’s democratization and its building war with jihadism.
- 61. Detainee Release:** (2003-?) US release of several hundred suspected jihadists scooped up in Operation Enduring Freedom and elsewhere led to documented cases of capture or killing of a few the same enemy fighters in Afghanistan or Pakistan. At least two conspirators in the *Cole* attack—convicted and then freed by Yemen—went on to commit suicide attacks in Iraq, contributing to US hesitation to transfer Yemenis held at Guantánamo to Sanaa’s custody. US suspicion mounted that the known cases of recidivism were the tip of an iceberg. By mid-2009, the Defense Department had estimated that some 14% of Guantánamo releasees had returned to terrorism.
- 62. Ex-KGB:** While the perception of many Russians that their struggle with Chechen separatists was part of the resistance to global jihad might make Moscow and Washington natural allies against Islamic extremism, the old adversaries’ long twilight struggle continues to reverberate. And the dominance in Russian leadership of former-KGB Cold Warriors no doubt prolongs the effect.
- 63. Gaza War:** (2006, 2008-2009) Israeli ground offensives into the Gaza Strip followed its voluntary withdrawal from the territory. Whether in the effort to rescue HAMAS-held Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, to stop Palestinian rocket strikes against Israeli border towns, or generally to pressure HAMAS and degrade its capabilities, the Israeli offensives kept the Gazans’ plight and HAMAS’s resistance in world media and front and center in the Arab street.
- 64. Hariri Killed:** (2005) Suspicion of Syria’s involvement in the 2005 murder of popular Lebanese former prime minister Rafiq Hariri generated massive Lebanese protests that forced the departure from the country of Syria’s occupation army. It also further isolated Syrian

strongman Bashar Assad, who meanwhile nipped any similar popular challenge or “Damascus Spring” at home in the bud.

**65. HEU:** The collapse of the USSR left tons of highly enriched uranium—usable in nuclear fission weapons—in poorly secured facilities in Russia and other former Soviet states. In 1994, US “Operation Sapphire” removed some 600 kilograms of HEU from a nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Kazakhstan. After US forces in 2001 invaded Afghanistan, they found primitive sketches for a nuclear weapon design hidden in *al-Qaeda* caves—but where would *al-Qaeda* obtain the needed fissile material?

**66. Homegrown:** (2004-?) British-born converted Muslim Richard Reid in late 2001 attempted on behalf of *al-Qaeda* to destroy a US airliner with a bomb hidden in his shoe. By 2004, British investigations into domestic Islamic terrorist activity were sharply on the rise. The breakup of an alleged Islamist cell in Luton, Bedfordshire, in August 2004, a devastating attack on London mass transit in July 2005 by British Muslims, and subsequent failed attacks and arrests in the UK demonstrated the reality of the domestic terror threat. Whether because of the UK’s close association with the US War on Terror and prominence in operations in Iraq or Afghanistan or other catalysts to be found in British society, the UK had become a beachhead for jihadism in Europe.

**67. Islamic Jihad Union:** (2004) A group focused on establishing Islamist rule in Uzbekistan and in solidarity with the global jihad, the IJU began with suicide and other attacks in that country and by 2007 were plotting in Germany as well.

**68. Jemaah Islamiya:** (2002-2005, 2009-?) Based in Indonesia and seeking to establish a caliphate over Southeast Asia’s Muslim populations, JI (“Islamic Group”) emerged spectacularly with a string of terror attacks against tourist and Western targets in Bali and Jakarta from 2002 to 2005. Counterterrorist successes followed the arrest of JI operations chief Hambali, including the death of chief JI bombmaker Azahari in late 2005. Little was heard from the group until the bombing of a pair of Jakarta hotels in 2009—including a Marriott already once struck by JI in 2003.

**69. Kazakh Strain:** The Soviets built facilities near the town of Stepnogorsk in northern Kazakhstan for factory-scale production of weapons-grade anthrax. Work on Marburg virus occurred nearby. This event postulates that jihadists—or those willing to sell to them—get their hands on some of the leftovers: seed cultures, weaponized product, or just the expertise to reproduce them.

**70. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba:** Among the largest Kashmiri-focused militant groups, LT (“Army of the Righteous”) is thought responsible for the 2006 and 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai. Its members have been arrested in Afghanistan and Iraq, and US authorities indicted 11 LT terrorists in Virginia in 2003. Islamabad banned LT in 2002, but many observers suspect that Pakistani security services have at times supported or sheltered the group.

**71. Loose Nuke:** Russia holds far and away the largest numbers of nuclear weapons in any country outside the United States—numbers large enough to make security and even simple accounting a major undertaking. A jihadist group looking for a nuclear weapon would have to include Russian organized crime groups among its list of potential vendors.

**72. Opium:** Taliban influence in areas of Afghanistan growing opium poppies is thought a major source of the group’s income, making opium eradication or crop substitution critical counterinsurgency endeavors.

**73. Pirates:** Though no evidence has emerged of ties between Somali pirates and the jihadists that have controlled portions of Somalia, the potential for Islamist extremists to sponsor and benefit from such piracy remains a concern.

**74. Schengen Visas:** The Schengen Agreement of 1985 created and later expanded a border control-free area partially overlapping the European Union. The Schengen area also aids illicit entry into Europe from outside the continent, because it means that someone able to slip into any one Schengen country can get into all of them.

**75. Schroeder & Chirac:** (2003) As the US pressed ahead its effort to build a coalition and obtain a UN mandate for Operation Iraqi Freedom, European governments divided on the question. Popular aversion to a US-led offensive war rendered any government’s stance against that US policy into a political asset, an effect no more ably exploited domestically than by the leaders of Germany and France.

**76. Abu Ghurayb:** (2004) Accounts of abuses committed in the major US military-run prison west of Baghdad—formerly the site of political torture under Saddam—would have been a world scandal in any event. But they became explosive through the visual impact of personal snapshots taken by guards. While the abuses had not been officially sanctioned, and the small number of guards involved were prosecuted, the searing images almost certainly inflamed extremist zeal and generated jihadist recruits within and far beyond Iraq.

**77. Al Jazeera:** Sponsored by the emir of Qatar and largely staffed by Palestinians, popular news channel *Al Jazeera* became a phenomenon by introducing a politically critical mass medium to the Arab world. Unfortunately for the struggle against extremism, however, the station during much of the post-9/11 period aired smuggled *al-Qaeda* videos, gruesome and relentless war footage from Gaza or Iraq, and partisan commentary on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**78. “Axis of Evil”:** (2002-2008) When President Bush in his State of the Union speech in the midst of military operations in Afghanistan declared of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil...”, it seemed to expand the war on *al-Qaeda* and close the door on US cooperation with Iran against a common Sunni jihadist enemy. For better or ill, the speech and the phrase continued to reverberate publicly and diplomatically throughout the US President’s tenure.

**79. Clean Operatives:** An elaborate international system developed after 9/11 to screen airline passengers and intercept those suspected of terrorist intent remained vulnerable to penetration by operatives whose ties to jihadism had been carefully obscured.

**80. FATA:** (2002-2009) With US and allied forces hunting them down in Afghanistan, *al-Qaeda* and Taliban remnants crossed the mountainous Pakistani border into that country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Northwest Frontier Province. The regions’ cross-border tribal ties, traditions of freedom from central government interference, and established networks for support of operations in Afghanistan made the FATA and NWFP enduring sanctuaries for Taliban insurgency and *al-Qaeda* training and plotting.

**81. Foreign Fighters:** (2003-2008) While the vast majority of insurgent fighters in Iraq have been Iraqis, a steady stream of volunteers from North Africa, the Arab Peninsula, and the Levant are thought to have provided most of the suicide bombers there—demonstrating an impact on the conflict beyond their numbers. The occupation of Iraq no doubt contributed to recruitment of these volunteers and thereby



put the “fly paper” theory of the Iraq War as a means to divert and debilitate *al-Qaeda’s* global jihad to a severe test.

**82. Jihadist Videos:** Carrying on a tradition predating the internet of radical imams’ use of cassettes to spread their sermons, those who would return the Muslim world to the Seventh Century have proven adept at exploiting the communications technologies of the Twenty-First.

**83. Kashmir:** Lurking beneath the surface of Islamabad’s alliance with the United States in the war on terror, Pakistan’s claim on Indian-occupied Kashmir—and its traditional shielding if not outright support for Islamist militancy there—has sometimes blocked Pakistani action against extremists, sometimes not.

**84.&85. Leak:** Revelations of harsh US interrogation techniques (2004), secret delivery of terrorist suspects to third countries (2005), and warrantless domestic surveillance (2005) embarrassed allies and gradually turned US discourse toward a softer posture in the fight against terrorism.

**86. Lebanon War:** (2006) In the midst of Israeli operations in Gaza sparked by the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by HAMAS, Hizballah conducted a strike on the Lebanese-Israeli border that captured two more. Israel responded with a ground invasion of Lebanon and heavy air bombardment of Hizballah command facilities and other Lebanese infrastructure. Effective Hizballah tactics against Israeli armor, Israeli forces’ inability to stop Hizballah rocket attacks into Israel, and footage of the further destruction of Beirut combined to cast Hizballah as resistance heroes to Sunni and Shia Muslims alike.

**87.-89. Martyrdom Operation:** Unlike the Japanese *kamikaze* of World War Two, jihadist suicide bombers are motivated by their belief not only that it is their duty to die but also that self-inflicted death will grant them paradise after life. Islam forbids suicide but makes an exception on the battlefield—and those fighting against US or Israeli occupation or for the global jihad have taken that exception to an extreme. The result is a force of operatives who are tremendously difficult to deter or stop. And the supply of young men and women willing to take their own lives in God’s cause—be it to kill just a few civilians or thousands in the act—appears endless.

**90. Quagmire:** (2003-2008) US critics of the invasion of Iraq began using the term “quagmire”—an implicit reference to the US defeat in Vietnam over a generation before—just a few months into the war. The US Secretary of Defense in a memo that went public in the fall of 2003 predicted a “long hard slog”. For the next several years—until the success of a US “surge” deployment into the country—US difficulties in Iraq would consume domestic political debate, color external relations, and help sap the nation’s will for sacrifice in the fight against extremism.

**91. Regional al-Qaeda:** (2002-?) After the loss of its sanctuary in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, *al-Qaeda* (“The Base”) relied for global reach in part on its endorsement of sympathetic local groups. The Algerian “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” was a classic example, in 2006 allying with Bin Ladin and changing its name to “Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb”. Yemen’s “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” is another.

**92. Saddam:** This event represents the possibility that Saddam Hussein—suspected but never demonstrated to have aided jihadists before the invasion of Iraq—would at some point have decided to use a portion of his oil wealth to aid his enemy’s enemy, *al-Qaeda*.

**93. Taliban:** (2004-?) After a series of US military, political, and diplomatic advances from 2001 on—including destruction of major forces of the *Taliban* (“religious students”), establishment of a pro-US government in Kabul and internationally-manned reconstruction teams in the provinces, an at least ostensible Pakistani turn away from support of the *Taliban*, and billions in aid to Afghan rebuilding—the militant movement bounced back. Skillful exploitation of sanctuary across the Pakistani border, perceived weaknesses of the Kabul government, and US focus of resources on the battle for Iraq enabled the Taliban to maintain or reestablish control of large areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. By 2009, Afghanistan rather than Iraq appeared the US emergency.

**94. “The door of Ijtihad was closed”:** See 47.

**95. Wahhabism:** Modern Saudi Arabia roots its legitimacy in an 18th-Century alliance between the Arab ruler Ibn Saud and the militant fundamentalist preacher Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Saud and his heirs cited Wahhab’s teachings as religious cause for their military conquest of other Muslims, and the Wahhabist al-Saud dynasty finally unified much of the Arab Peninsula in the early 20th Century. The Saudis’ Cold-War alliance with the United States against the common foes of Communism, then Khomeini’s Iran, and finally Saddam Hussein has not prevented the siphoning of the Kingdom’s oil wealth toward fundamentalist—and, many charge, jihadist—missionary work abroad.

**96. Danish Cartoons:** (2005) When a Danish newspaper’s series of satirical cartoons of the Prophet circulated around the world, Muslim protests outside Danish and other Scandinavian embassies turned fatally violent and some leaders issued death threats. The incident helped refocus Western reaction to extremism at a time of division over Iraq.

**97. Fatwa:** One religious scholar’s issued opinion on Islamic law—or *fatwa*—can easily contradict another, and such opinions can lead jihadists or potential jihadists in new or different directions. Bin Ladin in 1998 issued a famous *fatwa* urging the killing of Americans; Saudi cleric Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd published a fatwa in 2003 justifying the use of WMD against infidels. Meanwhile, Egyptian scholars in 2001 and Spanish and American Muslims in 2005 issued rulings against *al-Qaeda* terrorism (see event 13).

**98. Gaza Withdrawal:** (2005) Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip after 38 years of occupation sought to ease the burden on the Israeli Defense Forces, lessen Palestinian attacks on Israeli settlers, and demonstrate a willingness to make concessions in the peace process. But critics feared that jihadism might fill any security vacuum in the Strip.

**99. HAMAS Elected:** (2006) HAMAS (“Islamic Resistance Movement”) was formed to fight for an Islamic Palestinian state, including through terrorist attacks on Israelis, but has avoided deliberate attacks on US targets and has sought ties to the international community. The group leveraged its anti-corruption credentials to win Palestinian legislative elections in early 2006, after which it largely refrained from suicide bombings. On the negative side for the United States, the popularity of a US-designated terrorist organization caused some embarrassment to Washington and perceived threat to Israel. On the positive side, HAMAS’s victory via an election held the promise of a Palestinian Islamist alternative to global jihadism in the Arab struggle against “Zionists and Crusaders”.

**100. Hizb Ut-Tahrir:** HuT (“Party of Liberation”) a global, populist ideological movement that seeks to spread Islamic fundamentalism

across the world—is thought to have a million members spread over 40 countries. It organizes secretly but acts publicly: its program is to persuade the masses to shift their loyalty from corrupt or secular governments to an Islamist caliphate. While not convincingly tied to terrorism, its three-stage plan (described on its website) concludes with “seizing the reins of power” for a “comprehensive” implementation of Islam. Thus, because HuT shares the aims of the jihadists but does not call for immediate violence, it has the potential either to strengthen or divert support from *al-Qaeda* and other terrorist groups, depending on the frustration and urgency felt by its audience.

**101. Kosovo:** (2007–2008) US support (along with much of Europe) for a 2007 UN proposal for Kosovar independence from Serbia and the US Administration’s welcome of Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence naturally exacerbated tensions between Belgrade and Washington but gave the latter some claim as a protector of a Muslim people.

**102. Former Soviet Union:** To a degree inheriting the secularist and authoritarian traditions of the Soviet Union, the Muslim polities of Central Asia proved resilient both to Islamism and democratic reform.

**103. Hizballah:** Enduring and effective, the radical Lebanese Shiite group *Hizballah* (“Party of God”)—like its patron Iran—is friend to neither the US nor Sunni jihadists. Arch-enemy to neighboring Israel, the group can be counted upon to do what is needed to keep its armed strength within Lebanon, an impediment to the country’s democratic development. With its own cells and international reach, it also has the ability and incentive to curb the growth of anti-Shia jihadism.

**104.&105. Iran:** With ties to Shia militants throughout the Middle East, traditional enmity toward the Taliban, and a Shia theocracy ultimately incompatible with the Sunni caliphate envisioned by the jihadists, Iran’s regime always has the potential for indirect cooperation in the US war on terror. But its counterpoised ambitions for regional hegemony and nuclear capability, its historical adversity to Washington, and the threat posed to its regime by democratic ideals has more often led it to undermine US efforts in the region.

**106. Jaysh al-Mahdi:** (2004–2008) The organization of Iraqi Shia extremist militias and their attacks on Sunnis, the Government, and on Coalition forces (see also event 54) put Iraqi governance to one of its most severe tests. Iraqi government inaction threatened lawlessness, but overreaction portended tyranny. Either error might have lit a civil war. Firm but judicious action by Baghdad, in concert with occupation forces or on its own, eventually contained the Shiite militants.

**107. Kurdistan:** Sufficiently armed and organized to maintain a territory inside Iraq but beyond Saddam Hussein’s control, the Kurds were the masters of adroit maneuver against the odds to keep the possibility of an independent Kurdistan in play against the immediate interests not only of Baghdad but Ankara, Tehran, and Damascus as well. Nor did they overplay their hand in the aftermath of Saddam’s removal—occupying senior positions in the new Iraqi government even as they maintained autonomy in Kurdish areas and battled for their claim to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk against Arabs and Turkmen.

**108. Musharraf:** (2001–2008) Pakistani President and military strongman Pervez Musharraf after 9/11 turned his country to alliance with the US war on terror—dropping open ties to the Taliban

and supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. His new foreign policy required going against anti-US feelings and some Islamist leanings in the country, and he increasingly relied on means viewed as extra-constitutional to cling to rule in the face of overwhelming popular opposition.

**109. Tora Bora:** (2001) As anti-Taliban militia backed by US air strikes in late 2001 pushed *al-Qaeda* fighters into the mountains of Tora Bora, *al-Qaeda* obtained a temporary truce that, combined with probable rearguard actions, many believe allowed Bin Ladin to escape into Pakistan. An estimated 200 *al-Qaeda* fighters died, but critics in the US and elsewhere saw the battle as a botched best chance to capture the leadership responsible for 9/11.

**110. Zarqawi:** (2003–2006) Jordanian-born Palestinian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi proved a highly successful recruiter and plotter under conditions of US occupation. In the midst of Zarqawi’s campaign of high-profile suicide bombings that seemed to show occupation and government forces powerless to control the country, his group finally declared allegiance to Bin Ladin and became “Al-Qaeda in Iraq”. US warplanes killed Zarqawi in 2006 and his movement gradually succumbed.

**111. Zawahiri:** Like Bin Ladin, *al-Qaeda*’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, not only escaped US clutches in the aftermath of 9/11 but succeeded in delivering periodic messages to the world that mocked the US campaign against his organization.

**112. Bin Ladin:** With the *al-Qaeda* leader’s escape from US-backed forces in Afghanistan in late 2001 and retreat into hiding, his degree of control over the movement and even his life or death began topics of worldwide speculation. Periodic recordings of him delivered to the media—sometimes video, more often audio—helped answer the latter question to US chagrin.

**113. Darfur:** (2003–?) Sudan’s military operations and alleged support of atrocities in its separatist western province of Darfur set it into collision with the international community. Khartoum in response alternately resisted and accepted cooperation with the UN and regional diplomatic initiatives. Its historically pro-Islamist government still under suspicion for having hosted Bin Ladin in the 1990s and its President Omar al-Bashir by 2008 under indictment and arrest warrant on charges of crimes against humanity, Sudan increasingly tipped against *al-Qaeda* as it opted to avoid isolation by earning counterterrorist credentials.

**114. GTMO:** (2002–?) The US began holding suspected terrorist detainees at its Guantánamo Bay naval base in Cuba in early 2002, after a Justice Department ruling that an available detention camp there could be ruled outside US jurisdiction. The measure facilitated the long-term detention of combatants that the US legal system might otherwise release to return to battle against the US. Despite media access, routine International Committee of the Red Cross inspections of the facility and a 2006 US Supreme Court ruling giving prisoners there some Geneva Convention protections, the detention center remained a hated symbol of US extra-legal measures in its War on Terror. Whether that publicity served as a net encouragement or deterrent to jihadist recruitment remains in dispute.

**115. Hambali:** (2003) Hambali—Riduan Isamuddin—was thought to be the key link between *al-Qaeda* and Jemaah Islamiya and the top operator in the latter’s effort to establish Islamist rule across Southeast Asia. Counterterrorist authorities caught him in Thailand, whence he went into US custody.

**116. KSM:** (2003) Sensationally nabbed in Pakistan, alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was photographed for the world in a disheveled state immediately after his capture—symbolizing an apparent laying low of the once mighty *al-Qaeda*. According to his US captors, he later provided information that thwarted other attacks.

**117.&118. Oil Price Spike:** (2006, 2008) Muslim countries together possess some three-quarters of the world’s oil reserves, while the US alone consumes about a quarter of the world’s oil. A key jihadist allegation against the West is that it exploits the Muslim world’s wealth—particularly its oil—through corrupt, dictatorial, and un-Islamic puppet regimes, and therefore that the United States and the absence of true Islamist rule explain the Muslim world’s relative poverty despite its oil resources. Under these conditions, any effort to influence the destiny of the Islamic world must pay special attention to those countries in which that oil wealth is concentrated.

**119. Saleh:** (2001-?) Recalling frictions over the investigation of *al-Qaeda*’s 2000 bombing of the *USS Cole* in a Yemeni port, the US after 9/11 pressed Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh to join the “war on terror” unequivocally. But strong Islamist factions and prevalent anti-US sentiment in the country kept Saleh on a tightrope. Yemen accepted US anti-terror assistance but refused to extradite its detainees involved in the *Cole* plot. The later release or escape of all of those detainees along with continued *al-Qaeda* haven in less controlled parts of the country fueled US suspicions, and diversion of Yemeni security forces from anti-*al-Qaeda* operations to the quelling of a Shiite rebellion in the north of the country left Yemen’s alliance with the US as equivocal at the outset of President Obama’s Administration as it had been in Bush’s.

**120. US Election:** (2006) US public discourse over tactics in the “War on Terror” evolved dramatically as the shock of 9/11 wore off, no new Homeland plots succeeded, difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan mounted, and world opinion of the US worsened. Usually investigative US journalists in late 2001 declared that they would rather not know what the government did with *al-Qaeda* detainees. But soon thereafter, detainee handling and a host of other issues of how the war was to be fought became political footballs. While reelection of the President in 2004—even as the war in Iraq was going badly—seemed to affirm support for a hard US posture, that support was not to last through the next mid-term election.

## Prestige Change Summary

### At Turn End (5.2.5)

- -1 if any country under Islamist Rule.
- +1 if World Posture is “3” and same as US Posture.

### War of Ideas Operation (7.2.3)

- +1 if target country’s Posture ends same as US’s.

### Disrupt Operation (7.4.4)

- +1 if in a country with at least two troops.

### Deploy Operation (7.3.4-5)

- Roll Prestige if Regime Change or Withdraw.

### Unblocked Plot (8.5.6)

- -1 if in a country with troops.
- Roll Prestige if in the US.

### Major Jihad (8.4.4)

- To 1 if troops present and Governance to Islamist Rule.

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### Card Images

Sharia: [www.flickr.com/photos/zoomzoom](http://www.flickr.com/photos/zoomzoom)

Backchannel: [www.kremlin.ru](http://www.kremlin.ru)

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Danish Cartoons: English Wikipedia

Gaza Withdrawal: [www.flickr.com/photos/seejanesphotos](http://www.flickr.com/photos/seejanesphotos)

Hizb ut-Tahrir: EPO at Wikimedia

Darfur: Mark Knobil



## CARD LIST

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| 2. Biometrics . . . . .            | L, 1    | US | 45. Safer Now . . . . .   | 3       | US  | 86. Lebanon War . . . . .              | 3       | Jhd |
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| 4. Moro Talks . . . . .            | M, R, 1 | US | 47. “The door of Ijtihad was<br>closed” . . . . .               | L, 3    | US  | 88. Martyrdom Operation . . . . .      | 3       | Jhd |
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| 9. Special Forces . . . . .        | 1       | US | 52. IEDs . . . . .  | 1       | Jhd | 93. Taliban . . . . .                  | 3       | Jhd |
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| 39. Libyan WMD . . . . .           | M, R, 3 | US | 82. Jihadist Videos . . . . .                                   | 3       | Jhd |  |         |     |
| 40. Mass Turnout . . . . .         | 3       | US | 83. Kashmir . . . . .   | 3       | Jhd |  |         |     |
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### KEY

M = Mark, R = Remove, L = Lapsing

US = US-associated Event,

Jhd = Jihadist-associated Event

U = Unassociated Event

AUTO = Automatically Triggered Event

[2001] = Scenario



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